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Wolff: Wolff: Juror Questions

COMMENT
JUROR QUESTIONS
A SURVEY OF THEORY AND USE
Judging from current literature one might think that juror questions
are a recent phenomenon.' In fact, juror interrogation was known in
the English common law courts since at least the eighteenth century.'
Records of juror interrogation in American courts extend to the
nineteenth century. The earliest form of juror question was the juror
outburst, that is, a juror asking a question without invitation during

1. See, e.g., Beyler, Improving the Jury Selection Process, 73 ILL. B.J. 150,
155 (1984); Frankel, Judge Frankelon JurorsQuestioningWitnesses, 60 WIs. B.
BULL., Dec., 1987, at 23; Heuer & Penrod, TrialLawyers in the Box?, 13 DOCKET
4 (1989) [hereinafter Heuer & Penrod, Trial Lawyers]; Heuer & Penrod,
Increasing Jurors' Participationsin Trials: A Field Experiment with Jury
Notetaking andQuestionAsking, 12 LAw & HUM. BEHAV. 231 (1988) [hereinafter
Heuer & Penrod, Jurors' Participations];Sand & Reiss, A Report on Seven
Experiments Conducted by District Court Judges in the Second Circuit, 60
N.Y.U. L. REv. 423 (1985); Urbom, Toward Better Treatment of Jurors by
Judges,61 NEB. L. REv. 409 (1982); Comment, The Questioningof Witnesses by
Jurors, 27 AM. U.L. REV. 127 (1977); Note, Questions to Witnesses and
Notetaking by the Jury as Aids in UnderstandingComplex Litigation, 18 NEW
ENG. L. REv. 687 (1983); Sherman, Wider Role for Jurorsis Studied, Nat'l L.J.,
July 10, 1989, at 3, col. 1; Sixty Minutes: Trial By Jury (CBS television
broadcast, April 23,1989) (transcript available: 21 Sixty Minutes Transcriptno.
31) [hereinafter Sixty Minutes Transcript].
This Comment refers to "juror questions" as the questions jurors ask
witnesses or counsel during a trial. "Juror interrogation" refers to the juror's
asking of the question. These terms are used instead of "jury questions" (used
by some courts) to distinguish from references to questions of fact for the jury's
decision, as that term is most often used.
2. See 3 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 373
(1978) (reprint of 1783 ed.) ("the occasional questions of the judge, the jury, and
the counsel, propounded to the witnesses on a sudden, will sift out the truth");
M. HALE, THE HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW OF ENGLAND 164 (C. Gray ed.
1971) (1st ed. 1713) ("That by this Course of personal and open Examination,
there is Opportunity for all Persons concerned, viz. The Judge, or any of the
Jury... to propound occasional questions, which beats and boults out the
Truth .... ").
This Comment does not develop a detailed history of jury trials to prove this
point but notes the matter-of-fact statements of these commentators. One brief
historical survey may be found in Comment, supra note 1, at 134-39.
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1990
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examination of a witness. The first recorded incident of a juror outburst
found by this author was in an 1862 New York case.3 The North
Carolina Supreme Court in 1907 indicated that allowing juror questions
at the discretion of the trial court "has always been followed without
objection... in the conduct of trials in our superior courts."4 The
earliest record of juror outbursts in federal court is a 1921 Second
Circuit case.5 Juror questions were approved explicitly in 1895 in a
Missouri case7 and in 1917 jurors were invited to ask questions in an
Arizona case.
The controversy over juror interrogation today likely stems from the
fact that juror questions are now becoming a standard part of trial
procedure. The first formal system for jurors to ask questions found by
this author was a 1961 Missouri case in which a juror raised his hand,
was recognized by the court, and asked a question, whereupon the court
conferred with counsel for objections and then instructed the witness to
answer.8
In 1976, the Arizona appellate court recommended an
instruction to the jury on the procedure for asking questions.9 In 1979,
a court in the Fifth Circuit delivered the first pre-trial instruction
informing the jury of its right to ask questions and the procedure to be
followed.' °
To date, juror questions have been allowed in some form in five
United States Circuits" and twenty-five states and the District of

3. Kelley v. Commonwealth Ins. Co., 23 N.Y. Super. Ct. 82,99 (1862) (court
only addressed issue of improper juror question). An 1887 case, Chicago,
Milwaukee & St. Paul R.R. v. Krueger, 23 Ill. App. 639 (1887), considered a
juror question from the perspective of whether the juror was biased.
4. State v. Kendall, 143 N.C. 659, 662, 57 S.E. 340, 341 (1907).
5. Pacific Improvement Co. v. Weidenfeld, 277 F. 224 (2d Cir. 1921).
6. Schaeffer v. St. Louis & S. Ry., 129 Mo. 64, 30 S.W. 331 (1895).
7. Superior & Pittsburg Copper Co. v. Tomich, 19 Ariz. 182, 188-89, 165 P.
1101, 1104 (1917), affd, 250 U.S. 400 (1919), rev'd on other grounds, 22 Ariz.
543, 199 P. 132 (1921) (at counsel's invitation). The trial court had invited jury
questions in a California case in 1922. Mars v. H. Crummey, Inc., 55 Cal. App.
573, 204 P. 259 (1922).
8. Sparks v. Daniels, 343 S.W.2d 661 (Mo. Ct. App. 1961).
9. State v. Taylor, 25 Ariz. App. 497, 499, 544 P.2d 714, 716 (1976).
10. United States v. Callahan, 588 F.2d 1078 (5th Cir.), reh'g denied, 591
F.2d 1343 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 826 (1979). This case also is the
earliest record of formal juror interrogation in the federal courts. See also
Annotation, ProprietyofJurorsAsking Questions in Open Court DuringCourse
of Trial, 31 A.L.R.3D 872, 880-89 (1970).
11. Second Circuit: United States v. Witt, 215 F.2d 580 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 348 U.S. 887 (1954). FourthCircuit: United States v. Polowichak, 783
F.2d 410 (4th Cir. 1986); DeBenedetto v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 754 F.2d
512 (4th Cir. 1985). Fifth Circuit: United States v. Callahan, 588 F.2d 1078
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol55/iss3/7
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Columbia. 2 No court has ruled juror interrogation unconstitutional

(5th Cir.), reh'g denied, 591 F.2d 1343 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 826
(1979). Eighth Circuit: United States v. Gray, No. 89-2053 (8th Cir. Mar. 5,
1990) (1990 WL 19093); United States v. Johnson, 892 F.2d 707 (8th Cir. 1989);
United States v. Land, 877 F.2d 17 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 243 (1989).
Ninth Circuit: United States v. Gonzales, 424 F.2d 1055 (9th Cir. 1970).
The First Circuit has not yet ruled directly on the issue but appears to
follow the decisions of the other circuits. In United States v. Nivica, 887 F.2d
1110 (1st Cir. 1989) (opinion by Seyla, J.), appellant challenged the trial court's
refusal to allow the jury to interrogate him. The appellate court upheld the trial
court, noting the pitfalls of juror interrogation and that "[a]t most, use of such
a mechanism rests in the trial court's discretion." Id. at 1123 (citing DeBenedetto, 754 F.2d at 515-17).
12. Alabama: Prather v. Nashville Bridge Co., 286 Ala. 3, 236 So. 2d 322
(1970). Arizona: Superior & Pittsburgh Copper Co. v. Tomich, 19 Ariz. 182,165
P. 1101 (1917), afrd, 250 U.S. 400 (1919), rev'd on other grounds, 22 Ariz. 543,
199 P. 132 (1921); State v. LeMaster, 137 Ariz. 159, 669 P.2d 592 (Ct. App.
1983); State v. Taylor, 25 Ariz. App. 497, 544 P.2d 714 (1976). Arkansas:
Nelson v. State, 257 Ark. 1, 513 S.W.2d 496 (1974); Ratton v. Busby, 230 Ark.
667, 326 S.W.2d 889 (1959). California: People v. McAlister, 167 Cal. App. 3d
633, 213 Cal. Rptr. 271 (1985); O'Nellion v. Haynes, 122 Cal. App. 329, 9 P.2d
853 (1932); Maggart v. Bell, 116 Cal. App. 306, 2 P.2d 516 (1931); Maris v. H.
Crummey, Inc., 55 Cal. App. 573, 204 P. 259 (1922). Florida: Strawn v. State
ex rel. Anderberg, 332 So. 2d 601 (Fla. 1976); Scheel v. State, 350 So. 2d 1120
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1977). Georgia: Matchett v. State, 257 Ga. 785, 364 S.E.2d
565 (1988); State v. Williamson, 247 Ga. 685, 279 S.E.2d 203 (1981), rev'g 156
Ga. App. 856, 276 S.E.2d 260 (1980); Pierce v. State, 158 Ga. App. 343, 280
S.E.2d 381 (1981); Story v. State, 157 Ga. App. 490, 278 S.E.2d 97 (1981).
Illinois: Chicago Hansom Cab Co. v. Havelick, 131 Ill. 179, 22 N.E. 797 (1889);
Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul Ry. v. Harper, 128 M11.
384, 21 N.E. 561 (1889);
Coffey v. Sutton, 175 Ill. App. 331 (1912); North Chicago St. R.R. v. Burgess, 94
1l. App. 337 (1901); Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul R.R. v. Krueger, 23 Ill. App.
639 (1887). Indiana: Cheeks v. State, 266 Ind. 190, 361 N.E.2d 906 (1977);
Cherry v. State, 258 Ind. 298, 280 N.E.2d 818 (1972); Carter v. State, 250 Ind.
13, 234 N.E.2d 650 (1968); Dolezal v. Goode, 433 N.E.2d 828 (Ind. Ct. App.
1982). Iowa: Rudolph v. Iowa Methodist Medical Center, 293 N.W.2d 550 (Iowa
1980). Kentucky: Slaughter v. Commonwealth, 744 S.W.2d 407 (Ky. 1987), cert.
denied, 109 S. Ct. 3174, reh'g denied, 110 S. Ct. 11 (1989); Big Sandy &
Cumberland Ry. v. Thacker, 270 Ky. 404, 109 S.W.2d 820 (1937); Louisville
Bridge & Terminal Co. v. Brown, 211 Ky. 176, 277 S.W. 320 (1925); Stamp v.
Commonwealth, 200 Ky. 133,253 S.W. 242 (1923); Miller v. Commonwealth, 188
Ky. 435, 222 S.W. 96 (1920). Maryland: although no cases were found
discussing jury question in Maryland, Maryland's handbook for judges contains
a recommended procedure for jury questions. See Yeager v. Greene, 502 A.2d
980, 1001 n.27 (D.C. 1985). Michigan: People v. Heard, 388 Mich. 182, 200
N.W.2d 73 (1972); People v. Wesley, 148 Mich. App. 758,384 N.W.2d 783 (1985),
affid, 428 Mich. 708, 411 N.W.2d 159, cert. denied, 484 U.S. 967 (1987); People
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1990
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and the United States Supreme
Court consistently has denied certiorari
14
to juror question cases.

v. Stout, 116 Mich. App. 726,323 N.W.2d 532 (1982); People v. Charles, 58 Mich.
App. 371, 227 N.W.2d 348 (1975); People v. Justice, 50 Mich. App. 55, 212
N.W.2d 762 (1973). Minnesota: State v. Crawford, 96 Minn. 95, 104 N.W. 822
(1905). Mississippi: Myers v. State, 522 So. 2d 760 (Miss. 1988); Lucas v. State,
381 So. 2d 140 (Miss. 1980). Missouri: Schaeffer v. St. Louis & S. Ry., 128 Mo.
64, 30 S.W. 331 (1895); Sparks v. Daniels, 343 S.W.2d 661 (Mo. Ct. App. 1961);
State v. Sickles, 220 Mo. App. 290,286 S.W. 432 (1926); Ray v. Collins, 274 S.W.
1098 (Mo. Ct. App. 1925). Nebraska: See United States v. Land, 877 F.2d 17
(8th Cir.), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 243 (1989). New Mexico: State v. Rodriguez,
107 N.M. 611, 762 P.2d 898 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, 107 N.M. 546, 761 P.2d 424
(1988). New York: People v. Wilds, 141 A.D.2d 395, 529 N.Y.S.2d 325 (1988);
People v. Knapper, 230 A.D. 487, 245 N.Y.S. 245 (1930); Sitrin Bros., Inc. v.
Deluxe Lines, Inc., 35 Misc. 2d 1041, 231 N.Y.S.2d 943, (Cty. Ct. 1962); Kelley
v. Commonwealth Ins. Co., 23 N.Y. Super. Ct. 82 (1862). North Carolina: State
v. Howard, 320 N.C. 718, 360 S.E.2d 790 (1987); State v. Kendall, 143 N.C. 659,
57 S.E. 340 (1907). Ohio: State v. Sheppard, 100 Ohio App. 345, 128 N.E.2d
471 (1955), affd, 165 Ohio St. 293, 135 N.E.2d 340, cert. denied, 352 U.S. 910,
reh'g denied, 352 U.S. 955 (1956). Oklahoma: White v. Little, 131 Okla. 132,
268 P. 221 (1928); Smith v. State, 81 Okla. Grim. 412, 165 P.2d 381 (1946);
Krause v. State, 75 Okla. Grim. 381, 132 P.2d 179 (1942); Singleton v. State, 48
Okla. Grim. 276, 291 P. 145 (1930). Pennsylvania: Wallace v. Keystone Auto.
Co., 239 Pa. 110, 86 A. 699 (1913). South Carolina: State v. Barrett, 278 S.C.
414,297 S.E.2d 794 (1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1045 (1988); State v. Bradford,
87 S.C. 546, 70 S.E. 308 (1911). Tennessee: State v. Jeffries, 644 S.W.2d 432
(Tenn. Grim. App. 1982); Byrge v. State, 575 S.W.2d 292 (Tenn. Crim. App.
1978); Branch v. State, 4 Tenn. Grim. App. 164,469 S.W.2d 533 (1969). Texas:
Rojas v. Vuocolo, 142 Tex. 152, 177 S.W.2d 962 (1944); Espinoza v. State, 73
Tex. Grim. 237, 165 S.W. 208 (1914). Utah: State v. Martinez, 7 Utah 2d 387,
326 P.2d 102 (1958); State v. Anderson, 108 Utah 130, 158 P.2d 127 (1945).
Virginia: although no cases were found discussing the use of jury question in
Virginia, a handbook for jurors published by the Judicial Council of Virginia in
1975 recognizes the right of jurors to ask questions. See Yeager v. Greene, 502
A.2d 980, 1002 n.36 (D.C. 1985). District of Columbia: Yeager v. Greene, 502
A.2d 980 (D.C. 1985). There are A.L.R. articles keeping track of the status of
juror questions in both the state and federal courts which can, through the
pocket supplements, apprise the interested reader of the (fairly) latest tallies.
For state courts, see Annotation, supra note 10. For federal courts, see
Annotation, JurorsQuestioning Witnesses in FederalCourt,80 A.L.R. FED. 892
(1986).
13. Yeager, 502 A.2d at 981-82. Indeed, one scholar asserts that "the
discretion of the court to allow such questioning is undoubted." 3 J. WIGMORE,
EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT CoMMoN LAw § 784a (Supp. 1989).

14. See United States v. Land, 877 F.2d 17 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct.
243 (1989); United States v. Callahan, 588 F.2d 1078 (5th Cir.), reh'g denied,
591 F.2d 1343 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 826 (1979); United States v. Witt,
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol55/iss3/7
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This Comment will survey the contemporary use of juror questions.
The first section presents arguments in favor of and against allowing
juror interrogation. The second section compiles commentary from
judges who have allowed juror questions and includes two studies of
courts which have experimented with the procedure. The third section
surveys the various procedures used in implementing juror interrogation, as they have been recorded in court cases. The fourth section
offers a comprehensive model juror interrogation procedure.
I. THE JUROR QUESTION CONTROVERSY
Since the inception of the juror questioning, many judges and
scholars have argued in favor of or against allowing jurors to interrogate
witnesses. What follows is a summary of these arguments. For now
this controversy remains unresolved with each side emphasizing the
benefits or detriments of juror interrogation. At the least, these
arguments denote the goals sought and the failures to be avoided for
any court considering instituting juror interrogation.

A. The Arguments for JurorInterrogation
Those in favor of juror interrogation focus on the jury's role as the

finder of fact and discerner of truth; these advocates view juror
questions as a means of improving the jury's information and understanding of the issues it must decide. The benefit of juror interrogation
can be summarized in the words of one advocate: "the better informed
the jury, the more likely it is to render a just verdict."'15 For juror
question advocates, the pragmatic benefits of better-informed juries, and
thus of better-considered verdicts, exceed the theoretical risks of altering
a settled and static system of trial procedure. 6

215 F.2d 580 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 887 (1954); Slaughter v. Commonwealth, 744 S.W.2d 407 (Ky. 1987), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 3174, reh'g denied,
110 S. Ct. 11 (1989); People v. Wesley, 148 Mich. App. 758, 384 N.W.2d 783
(1985), affd, 148 Mich. App. 758, 411 N.W.2d 159, cert. denied, 484 U.S. 967
(1987); State v. Sheppard, 100 Ohio App. 345, 128 N.E.2d 471 (1955), afrd, 165
Ohio St. 293, 135 N.E.2d 340, cert. denied, 352 U.S. 910, reh'g denied, 352 U.S.

955 (1956); State v. Barrett, 278 S.C. 414, 297 S.E.2d 794 (1982), cert. denied,
460 U.S. 1045 (1983).
15. Interview with Hon. Scott 0. Wright, United States District Court,
Western District of Missouri, in Kansas City, Missouri (May 2, 1989) [hereinafter Wright Interview].
16. For one case in which this kind of balancing test was undertaken, see
LeMaster, 137 Ariz. at __ 669 P.2d at 597-98. See also Urbom, supranote 1,
at 422 ("The advantages are real, and the shortcomings are either imaginary or
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1990
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Allowing jurors to ask questions allows jurors to clarify issues about
which they are confused. 7 As expressed by one court, juror interrogation provides "reasonable help in resolving legitimate questions which
trouble [the jury] but have not been answered through the interrogation
of witnesses by counsel.' 8 In the medical malpractice case before that
court plaintiff had sued for injuries to his spine as a result of being
dropped while in a hospital. A juror asked the doctor in charge of the
plaintiff-patient the following questions:
"Would the previously
described incident involving the alleged dropping of [plaintiffs] head
necessarily result in visible disruption or damage to the dura or other
parts of the spine?... How is the depth of the drilling of the intervertebral disc determined insofar as the depth varies from person to
person?"'19 Questions such as these aid a juror's understanding of
medical terminology and its relation to a plaintiffs injury.
Another case, Byrge v. State,2" involved a criminal trial for forgery
in which the identification of the defendant was based on an F.B.I.
fingerprint analysis. A juror asked the F.B.I. officer how many points
of comparison were required before two sets of fingerprints were deemed
alike. The witness responded that there was no set number but that
seven was the fewest used.2 1 In State v. Anderson,22 defendant was
accused of stealing money under the guise of a chiropractor. The jury
asked the defendant-witness how he had examined the victim and
whether the victim was wearing a coat and had anything in his
pockets.2 The state supreme court ruled that these were questions
that could have been asked in direct examination and they clarified
4
material points in the defendant's testimony.2

easily avoidable.").
17. See United States v. Callahan, 588 F.2d 1078, 1086 (5th Cir.), reh'g
denied, 591 F.2d 1343 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 826 (1979); Yeager v.
Greene, 502 A.2d 980, 982 n.7, 998 (D.C. 1985); Stamp v. Commonwealth, 200
Ky. 133, 143, 253 S.W. 242, 246 (1923) ("it is often necessary to a fair understanding of the issues that jurors ask[] questions of the witnesses").
18. Rudolph v. Iowa Methodist Medical Center, 293 N.W.2d 550, 556 (Iowa
1980).
19. Id.
20. 575 S.W.2d 292 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1978).
21. Id. at 294.
22. 108 Utah 130, 158 P.2d 127 (1945).
23. Id. at 134, 158 P.2d at 128.
24. Id.; see also Smith v. State, 81 Okla. Crim. 412, 419, 165 P.2d 381, 384
(1946), a criminal action for assault in which a juror asked what type of Army
discharge defendant had received; defendant responded it was for inaptitude.
Although the question might seem prejudicial, the court ruled it was not.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol55/iss3/7
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Juror interrogation also allows the juror to seek out evidence it
feels is necessary for its decision but which counsel have failed to
adduce. One judge has observed that "a juror may, and often does, ask
a very pertinent and helpful question in furtherance of the investigation. 'n2
In Sitrin Bros., Inc. v. Deluxe Lines, Inc.,' jurors asked
technical questions concerning a matter "in which apparently counsel
was not too interested or too well advised."2' 7 As a result of its inquiry
the jury was able to throw out a damage claim.2 Another example is
found in People v. Stout,' a trial for drug possession. In that trial a
police officer had testified about the test used to identify the nature of
the substance seized from the defendant. A juror asked whether there
could have been extraneous matter in the item seized that could have
clouded the test results.'
A good example of a jury's extensive
examination is found in People v. McAlister3 ' where four jurors asked
twelve questions of a witness concerning the scene of an accident. 2
And in the trial in State v. Howard,' a prosecution for rape, a nurse
had testified about the examination of the victim and the alcohol level
in her blood at the time she entered the hospital. A juror inquired
about the procedure used to test the blood.'
The benefit of these types of questions seems apparent: resolving
ambiguities in the jurors' minds helps them come to a more competent
decision. As the Honorable Scott 0. Wright, Chief Judge of the United
States District Court for the Western District of Missouri, has put it, it
is better for jurors to ask their questions immediately, even if improper,
than to leave them unresolved and open for speculation in deliberations.
Questions from jurors also generally improve communication
between counsel and jury. This occurs in two ways. In one respect,

25. State v. Kendall, 143 N.C. 487, 489, 57 S.E. 340, 341 (1907); see also
Urbom, supranote 1, at 422 ("jurors do not ask many questions but they usually
ask good ones").
26. 35 Misc. 2d 1041, 231 N.Y.S.2d 943 (Civ. Ct. 1962).
27. Id, at 1043, 231 N.Y.S.2d at 946.

28. Id
29.
30.
31.
ter).
32.
33.
34.
35.

116 Mich. App. 726, 323 N.W.2d 532 (1982).
I& at 732, 323 N.W.2d at 535.
167 Cal. App. 3d 633, 213 Cal. Rptr. 271 (1985) (vehicular manslaughId at 638-42, 213
320 N.C. 718, 360
Id at 727-28, 360
Wright Interview,

Cal. Rptr. at 273-75.
S.E.2d 790 (1987).
S.E.2d at 795.
supra note 15.

Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1990
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juror questions alert counsel to matters that need further development.' This would be especially important in complex litigation where
counsel might not fully develop its evidence by virtue of mistake or
familiarity with the case. In another respect, juror questions improve
the quality of communication between counsel, witnesses, and the jury.
As Judge Wright has observed, the interplay between counsel and the
jury helps counsel to present the evidence at the jury's level of under37
standing.
This latter point deserves special consideration because the
disparity in understanding between the jury and counsel is often
disregarded. Counsel or witness and juror often have different social,
cultural, and educational backgrounds which cause subtle differences of
semantics in language between speaker and hearer. Because of this
semantic gap a juror is likely not to understand fully what the speaker,
that is, counsel or witness, intended to communicate. In the traditional
trial format, jurors have no direct way of indicating their understanding
of what was communicated to them and thus court and counsel have no
means of detecting any disparities of understanding. Yet with such
imperfect understanding the jury must decide the facts of the case.
With such a system, erroneous or improper verdicts are highly probable.
The juror question bridges this semantic gap to a degree because
the questions asked by a juror indicates his understanding of the
evidence presented. From this, counsel can more readily detect juror
misunderstanding and restructure the presentation of evidence to
improve the jurors' understanding.'
Another benefit from allowing juror interrogation is that it
increases the jurors' attention and keeps them more interested in the
case. Allowing jurors to ask questions "results in their putting forth
more effort to listen and to understand because they know they may ask
questions."3' 9 The Honorable Warren D. Wolfson, Circuit Judge for

36. See, e.g., United States v. Callahan, 588 F.2d 1078, 1086 (5th Cir.), reh'g
denied, 591 F.2d 1343 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 826 (1979); Yeager v.
Greene, 502 A.2d 980, 982 n.7, 998 (D.C. 1985); see also Frankel, supra note 1,
at 23,24 ("Lawyers... stand to benefit by learning what the jury's concerns are
and where the evidence may be unclear."); Urbom, supranote 1, at 419 (remarks
of Judge Urbom of the United States District Court in Nebraska) (the questions
"may well be a clue to counsel of a line of inquiry that needs to be made"); Sixty
Minutes Transcript, supra note 1, at 5, 6) (remarks of Judge Robert Landry)
(questions "direct the attorneys to the concerns of the jury"). Judge Wright of
the United States District Court, Western District of Missouri, has found that
lawyers who at first disliked the system have come to appreciate it for this
aspect. Wright Interview, supra note 15.
37. Wright Interview, supra note 15.
38. See Yeager, 502 A.2d at 998-99; Comment, supra note 1, at 130-31.
39. Yeager, 502 A.2d at 1000; see also Frankel, supra note 1, at 23.24.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol55/iss3/7
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Cook County, Illinois, has found that jurors "listen better [because] they
feel like they are a part of the process and not just some distant
audience. 40
Because juror interrogation involves jurors as active
participants in the trial, they will become more interested in the trial
and pay more attention.
One criticism of juror interrogation is that it increases the chances
of a juror making improper or prejudicial statements or inquiries. To
this proponents respond that airing such prejudices in open court is in
fact beneficial. According to Judge Wright, it is better for jurors to ask
prejudicial questions in court because then the judge may warn the jury
of their error and even explain why the testimony sought is improper.
Even if the effectiveness of the remedy is questionable, it certainly is
more effective than just leaving the jury to ask the same questions in
deliberations, to be answered only by the jurors' speculation.4 It is
better that a juror indicate bias to the court and counsel than for such
bias to remain hidden until it affects deliberations. It is easier to
recognize and remedy a biased juror from statements in court than from
42
verdicts or judgments that may or may not be supported by the facts.
This argument applies equally to juror questions which are not
biased but only improper. For example, in some cases jurors have
improperly inquired of a defendant's insurance.43 It is certainly better
for court and counsel to know definitely that a juror is considering
improper matters than to presume such occurrences post facto from the
jury's verdict. When jurors ask questions which evince their concern for
a party's insurance, the court may make an effort to inform the jury of
its error and set it aright. The recorded juror question about insurance
also could present a stronger case on appeal that a seemingly excessive
verdict was prompted by the jury's consideration of insurance. If a juror
is unable to indicate in court her improper consideration, then it is left

40. Sherman, supranote 1, at 9, col. 1. For an empirical substantiation of
this belief, see the discussion of the court surveys infra notes 101-18 and
accompanying text.
41. Wright Interview, supra note 15. Judge Urbom agrees with this
assessment, having stated, "A question about an inappropriate subject affords
the judge an opportunity to deal squarely with the fact of the inappropriateness.... [A]llowing questions by jurors tends to open the trial, whereby
forbidden subjects canbe declared forbidden and canbe treated, rather than left
to fester in the jury room." Urbom, supra note 1, at 419.
42. This rationale was also mentioned by the Hon. Henry F. Greene of the
District of Columbia Superior Court in his memorandum and order reprinted in
Yeager v. Greene, 502 A.2d 980, 998 (D.C. 1985).
43. See, e.g., O'Nellion v. Haynes, 122 Cal. App. 329, 9 P.2d 853 (1932);
Maggart v. Bell, 116 Cal. App. 306, 2 P.2d 516 (1931); Kelly v. Commonwealth
Ins. Co., 23 N.Y. Super. Ct. 82,99 (1862); Rojas v. Vuocolo, 142 Tex. 152, 156-57,
177 S.W.2d 962, 963-64 (1944).
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to speculation whether the jury did in fact consider insurance in its
verdict."
Even when the juror's inquiry is not prejudicial or improper but
merely unnecessary, responding to the inquiry in court may be helpful.
For example, in one trial a juror had asked whether it was legally
impermissible for a deponent to see others' depositions before giving his
own. ' The court responded that this was permissible.4 6 Such an
inquiry had little to do with the trial and the question certainly was not
prejudicial. But the effect of such a doubt in a juror's mind is indeterminable; answering the question at least resolves the doubt.

B. The Arguments Against JurorInterrogation
Opponents of juror interrogation note the threat juror questions
pose to a traditional trial procedure which has been developed over
centuries to ensure a fair trial. The opponents' paramount concern is
trial fairness. The principal evil juror interrogation poses is that it
undermines a structure designed to ensure that a jury considers only
what it fairly should, when it should.
One aspect of this unfairness is that the juror question places
counsel in an untoward dilemma. As the court in State v. Sickles47 put
it, counsel is "put to the choice of offending a juror by an objection or
letting incompetent testimony go in without objection .... If [counsel]
objects to the question and by doing so offends the juror and he loses his
case he has no remedy."48 Similarly, if counsel successfully objects or

44. This reasoning applies, of course, to any improper considerations of the
jury, e.g., defendant's attempts to settle out of court, Big Sandy & Cumberland
Ry. v. Thacker, 270 Ky. 404, 407, 109 S.W.2d 820, 821 (1937), and defendant's
refusal to testify, Espinoza v. State, 73 Tex. Grim. 237, 165 S.W. 208 (1914).
45. Transcript at 243, Darnell v. Ford, No. 88-4468-CV-C-S (W.D. Mo. Feb.
13, 1989) [hereinafter Transcript].
46. Id at 243-44.
47. 220 Mo. App. 290, 286 S.W. 432 (1926).
48. Id at 433, 286 S.W. at 293; see also DeBenedetto v. Goodyear Tire &
Rubber Co., 754 F.2d 512, 515 (4th Cir. 1985) (argument of counsel). Although
the Debenedetto court recognized the merits of this argument, it asserted that
under the procedure used by the trial court counsel could have objected to the
jury question procedure outside the presence of the jury. Id at 515; see also
State v. Martinez, 7 Utah 2d 387, 389, 326 P.2d 102, 103 (1958) ("counsel dare
not object lest they invoke the displeasure of the inquisitorial jurors"); People v.
McAlister, 167 Cal. App. 3d 633, 643, 645, 213 Cal. Rptr. 271, 277 (1985);
Strawn v. State ex rel Anderberg, 332 So. 2d 601, 602 (Fla. 1976); Stinson v.
State, 151 Ga. App. 533, 536, 260 S.E.2d 407, 410 (1979); Stamp v. Commonwealth, 200 Ky. 133, 143, 253 S.W. 242, 246 (1923); White v. Little, 131 Okla.
132, 133-34,268 P. 221,222-23 (1928). See generally Annotation, supranote 10,
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol55/iss3/7
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counsers witness refuses to answer a juror's question, the jury is likely
to believe that the witness is concealing something; at least the jury
could place less value in such witness's testimony.4 9
The acuteness of this problem will vary with the context. For
example, in Story v.State,5° a trial for child molestation, the jury was
allowed to question directly the seven year-old victim.5 ' The prejudicial problems of such testimony are severe enough when counsel
examines such witnesses. For counsel to attempt to thwart a juror's
examination of such a witness would seem quite a threat to counsel's
standing with the jury.
As a result of this dilemma a greater variety of evidence can be
allowed into trials. Because counsel would be hesitant to object to juror
questions, much otherwise inadmissable testimony could be admitted.
This can only be prevented to the extent that the judge is vigilant in
preventing such testimony. But even the best judge cannot immediately
determine the admissibility of all borderline questions as they are asked
and thus some questionable testimony necessarily will get through. 52
Juror interrogation opponents advocate traditional trial procedure
as a necessary, if cumbersome, device to ensure that the jury properly
serves its discreet function in the trial process: the impartial body
which declares the facts on the basis of the evidence presented to it.
Opponents emphasize the principles of fairness underlying this
structure over possible practical gains from enhancing the -information
presented to the jury. As one court has said,
I think the question is really whether or not we want an inquisitorial
system or we want a system of jury trials which are conducted by a
Judge with the assistance of trained advocates, in accordance with
well-developed and historically sound rules of law; particularly, those
rules of law that deal with procedure, rights of defendant, and
53
questions of what may or may not be introduced.

at 881-82.
For an empirical refutation of this argument, see discussion of court surveys
infra note 114 and accompanying text.
49. Krause v. State, 75 Okla. Crim. 381, 386-87, 132 P.2d 179, 182 (1942);
Strawn, 332 So. 2d at 605; see also United States v. Johnson, 892 F.2d 707, 712,
713 (8th Cir. 1989) (Lay & McMillian, JJ., concurring).
50. 157 Ga. App. 490, 278 S.E.2d 97 (1981).
51. Id at 491, 278 S.E.2d at 98.
52. An example of this can be found in Johnson, where, in a trial for drug
possession, a juror asked defendant how long he had been on drugs. Johnson,
892 F.2d at 711. Counsel did not object nor did the court intervene. Id. at 710,
711-12.
53. Strawn v. State ex reL. Anderberg, 332 So. 2d 601, 605 (Fla. 1976)
(remarks of trial judge).
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One essential aspect of traditional trial procedure is the manner in
which it ensures that the finder of fact bases its decision solely on
proper evidence. As stated by one judge:
Our judicial system is founded upon the presence of a body constituted
as a neutral factfinder to discern the truth from the positions
presented by the adverse parties. The law of evidence has as its
purpose the provision of a set of rules by which only relevant and
admissible evidence is put before that neutral factfinder. Individuals
not trained in the law cannot be expected to know and understand
and perhaps more importantly, what is
what is legally relevant,
54
legally admissible.
As stated by the trial judge in Strawn v.State ex rel. Anderberg,
"Our system depends on utter impartiality [of the jury] and upon having
two trained counsel to ask questions, to object to each other's questions
at times, and to ask those questions for the purpose of eliciting
admissible evidence."5 5 Because jurors are not trained lawyers they
necessarily are more likely to seek improper testimony from witnesses.5 As noted supra at least some of this inadmissible testimony will
enter the jury's decision of facts. Consequently, the jury will be deciding
facts to a degree on information which the legal community long has
determined should not be considered.
An example of this problem is found in State v. Sickles." In a
trial for criminal possession of alcohol, the defendant testified on his
own behalf. A juror asked defendant whether he was a naturalized
citizen, how long he had been in the United States, and what was his
nationality. Defendant declared he was a Russian Jew. This juror
asked a number of similar questions, all of which the appellate court
declared clearly prejudicial and irrelevant. 58 The jury ultimately
convicted the defendant. What information formed the basis of this

54. DeBenedetto v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 754 F.2d 512,516 (4th Cir.
1986) (opinion written by the Hon. James H. Michael, Jr., United States District
Judge for the Western District of Virginia, sitting by designation).
55. Strawn, 332 So. 2d at 602 (remarks to jury in declaring mistrial).
56. See United States v. Callahan, 588 F.2d 1078, 1086 (5th Cir.), reh'g
denied, 591 F.2d 1343 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 826 (1979) (argument of
counsel); Strawn, 332 So. 2d at 602; State v. Stinson, 151 Ga. App. 533,536,260
S.E.2d 407, 410 (1979); State v. Howard, 320 N.C. 718, 725, 360 S.E.2d 790,
794-95 (1987); Krause v. State, 75 Okla. Crim. 381, 386-87, 132 P.2d 179, 182
(1942).
57. 220 Mo. App. 290, 286 S.W. 432 (1926).
58. Id. at 433-34.
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verdict is unknown; the state court of appeals found enough of a
possibility of improper consideration to reverse the conviction.59
Opponents of juror interrogation also argue that juror questions will
too often seek unnecessary evidence and thus waste trial time on
irrelevant issues.' With dockets as crowded as they are, courts do not
need another impediment to speedy trials.
The other aspect of traditional trial procedure which juror interrogation affects is the jury's position as the "fair and impartial arbiter of
evidence brought before it."61 Impartiality is essential to a fair trial
because only the impartial jury gives full consideration to all and only
the evidence presented to it.
One way in which juror interrogation undermines the jury's
impartiality is by inducing the jury to decide the facts before all of the
evidence has been presented. Once the juror is allowed to become
interrogator he "will develop a line [of] questioning which predisposes
that juror towards a particular finding of guilt or innocence and once
committed to that role as an 'advocate' could well find6 it
impossible to
2
retreat once again to the position of a neutral arbiter.
[The] jurors will become advocates. They will lose their ability
to remain neutral. If they don't like an answer or given the
way its given or if objections by Counsel to a question asked by
a juror, and they take an adverse position established by that
objection... instead of fair and impartial jurors who are not
going to form or express any opinions until the entire case has
been heard, we would... have some advocates on the jury.6
One judge has noted how
the questioning juror has begun the deliberative process with
his fellow jurors... : [S]tating the question and receiving the
answer in the hearing of the remaining jurors begins the
reasoning process in the minds of the jurors, stimulates further

59. Id.; see also United States v. Johnson, 892 F.2d 707, 710 (8th Cir. 1989)
(juror asking criminal defendant about past drug use).
60. See, e.g., Pacific Improvement Co. v. Weidenfeld, 277 F. 224,227 (2d Cir.
1921) (jury interrupted examination with "unnecessary questions" about 35
times); State v. Jeffries, 644 S.W.2d 432,434-35 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1982) (juror
questions cover 42 transcript pages).
61. State v. LeMaster, 137 Ariz. 159, _ 669 P.2d 592, 596-97 (Ct. App.
1983) (counsel's arguments).
62. Id.
63. Strawn v. State ex rel. Anderberg, 332 So. 2d 601, 605-06 (Fla. 1976).
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questions among jurors, whether asked or not, and generally
affects the deliberative process.6
The Honorable Donald P. Lay, Chief Judge of the United States Court
of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, emphasizes the importance in the
adversarial system of preserving the jury's neutrality until deliberations.6 Judge Lay asserts that
juror questions [disrupt] neutrality, because even a seemingly
innocuous response to a seemingly innocuous juror question can sway
the jury's appraisal of the credibility of the witness, the party, and the
case. The factfinder who openly engages inrebuttal or cross-examination, even by means of a neutral question, joins sides prematurely and
potentially closes off its receptiveness to further suggestions of a
different outcome for the case. While nothing can assure the jury will
remain open-minded to the end, keeping the jury out of the advocacy
process increases the probability.6
For a party to get a fair trial, the jury must remain neutral so that
it is predisposed toward giving each party's presentation of the facts
equal consideration. Juror interrogation, especially during presentation
of evidence, undermines this predisposition toward neutrality by
allowing the jury to begin judging the evidence immediately in
considering questions to ask.
Examples of the effects on juror neutrality are found in counsel's
observations in People v. McAlister.67 Counsel noted the danger that
jurors "might get a little bit more concerned with thinking of questions
to ask, and that distracts them from actually listening to the eviIn the trial, during the jury's extensive examination of
dence."'
certain witnesses, the jury "got all excited, and all of a sudden, some of
them were writing down questions." Because of this there "no longer... [was] a neutral party ruling with the questions coming from the
counsel and the witnesses answering."6 9 This problem also arose in
People v. Wilds, 0 a criminal trial, where a juror asked the victim why

64. DeBenedetto v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 754 F.2d 512,516 (4th Cir.
1985) (opinion written by the Hon. James H. Michael, Jr., United States District
Judge for the Western District of Virginia, sitting by designation).
65. See United States v. Johnson, 892 F.2d 707,711 (8th Cir. 1989) (opinion
of Lay, J., concurring) ("as long as we adhere to an adversary system of justice,
the neutrality and objectivity of the juror must be sacrosanct").
66. Id
67. 167 Cal. App. 3d 633, 642, 213 Cal. Rptr. 271, 275 (1985).
68. I&
69. Id. at 643, 213 Cal. Rptr. at 275-76.
70. 141 A.D.2d 395, 529 N.Y.S.2d 325 (1988).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol55/iss3/7
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it took so long to identify the defendant in court and whether the State
had established a particular fact."' The appeals court ruled that these
questions were improper and demonstrated the jury's premature
deliberations. 2
Indeed, juror interrogation may even render jurors adversarial
against one party or another.' Examples of this phenomenon can be
found in a number of cases. In Chicago, Milwaukee, & St. Paul
74 an action for negligence, a juror interrogated
Railroad v. Harper,
defendant's witness in the following manner:
Question:

Is your memory good?

Answer: Yes, sir.
Q: Do you remember anything that transpired yesterday, about a
week from now; do you remember what you had seen?
A: Sometimes I may, and sometimes I don't pay no attention; but
such things as that, of course I would.
Q: Don't you remember of saying previous to this the cars were all
moved from one side of the street to be fixed...
A: I don't remember.
Q: Your memory is so bad you cannot remember from this forenoon
to the afternoon?7" 5
In State v. Jeffries,7 1 defendant was accused of selling heroin.
defense, defendant had produced an employer as an alibi-witness.
part of many prejudicial, argumentative, and irrelevant questions to
employer extending over forty-two pages of transcript a juror made
following statement:

In
As
the
the

My question, the reason for my line of questioning is that if the
gentleman was working for you in February, then shortly thereafter
he was, whatever took place, whether he was taken in custody or
whatever did take place, if that man was an employee of yours and he
was in such a position to be manager, why wouldn't you have known
or why wouldn't you have said something back at that time if he were
such an important employee of yours and so forth and it wasn't until
September of '78 that all this took place?

71. Id at 397, 529 N.Y.S.2d at 326-27.
72. Id. at 398, 529 N.Y.S.2d at 327.
73. See, e.g., Krause v. State, 75 Okla. Crim. 381, 386, 132 P.2d 179, 182
(1942) (juror had "assumed the role of prosecutor," asking prejudicial and
argumentative questions).
74. 128 Ill. 384, 21 N.E. 561 (1889).
75. Id. at . 21 N.E. at 561.
76. 644 S.W.2d 432 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1982).
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I was just wondering, I'm sorry, but if I had somebody working
for me and they had some offense committed ....
The court found this and similar questions to be sufficiently prejudicial
to merit a reversal.78
A stronger example is given in Slaughter v. Commonwealth. In
a murder trial defendant had testified that a friend named "Red" had
committed the actus reus. A juror engaged in the following interrogation:
He stated that he knew, he and this Red had been friends for
sometime. Where did this Red live[?] ... Where did he hang out at?
Why didn't any of your friends know about you and Red... [Defendant responded that Red lived on Hill Street] You are asking for your
life and nobody can find Red and you refuse. Why do you refuse to
tell his address so he can be found to save you probably?' °
What makes this incident particularly egregious is that the state
supreme court ruled that this questioning was a legitimate inquiry of
Red's existence.8 ' The court noted that this question would have been
asked in deliberations anyway and thus the fact that it was stated in
court in the presence of the other jurors did not necessarily prejudice
defendant's case.8 2 But the question is whether the fact that the juror
made his statement at that time, right after defendant had offered his
alibi testimony, prejudiced the other jurors. It is also questionable
whether this juror had already convicted the defendant before the
completion of the trial.
The fact that this court found no problem with this questioning
undermines the argument that prejudicial jurror statements made in
court are helpful in revealing juror bias. It is of no help to reveal juror
bias and then do nothing about it. In this instance it may have been
better to take the chance that this juror would not have influenced the
jury in deliberations rather than virtually ensure such influence by the
juror's statements in court.
Both problems of improper evidence and biased juries are exacerbated by the fact that jurors are more likely to put greater weight in

77. Id. at 434.
78. Id- at 435.
79. 744 S.W.2d 407 (Ky. 1987), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 3174, reh'g denied,
110 S. Ct. 11 (1984).
80. Id. at 413.
81. Id.
82. Id.
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testimony elicited from their own questions. a 3 The jurors' faith in their
own abilities to find the truth may be so strong as to withstand any
admonition from the court.
The arguments for and against juror interrogation have no
apparent resolution, nor are they wholly substantiated or refuted by
empirical studies. 4 One's opinion of juror interrogation likely will be
shaped by one's opinion of juries generally: the more faith one has in
jury decision-making, the more prone one may be to enhancing the
jury's role in trial. Much of the debate today is driven by prejudices
about juries and trials. Only the experience of judges at the trial level
can fairly evaluate the procedure. Aware of the goals to be sought and
the harms to be avoided, each judge must decide for her or his own
court whether and how to implement juror questions.

II. JUROR QUESTIONS IN PRACTICE
Many judges who have allowed juror questions have reported in the
media: that they like the procedure. They employ a variety of methods
which are described below. The Honorable Warren K. Urbom, Chief
Judge of the United States District Court in Lincoln, Nebraska, allows
written juror questions and recommends the procedure "without
The Honorable Mark Frankel, of the Dane County
reservations."8
Circuit Court in Wisconsin, allows juror questions in about 90% of trials
before him.86 He has been allowing the procedure since 1982.7 He
usually does not allow questions when significant evidence will be
suppressed or the evidence will mostly be videotaped depositions.88 In

83. See DeBenedetto v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 754 F.2d 512, 516-17
(4th Cir. 1985).
84. Court studies are discussed infra notes 101-18 and accompanying text.
85. Ranii, Judges PushIncreasedJury Role, Nat'l L.J., Aug. 16, 1982, at 1,
col. 4. Judge Urbom also uses this oral question procedure:
[J]urors... direct the questions to the judge. In turn, the judge
decides whether the question meets the legal rules and, if so, the
judge puts the question to the witness. If the question is not to be put
to the witness, the judge gives the jury a brief explanation of why the
judge has ruled it out. If there is any doubt as to the propriety of the
question, the judge calls counsel to the bench for a conference or hears
from counsel outside the presence of the jury. If questions by jurors
are relayed to and answered by a witness, counsel are then afforded
opportunity to examine and cross-examine the witness on the subject
of those questions.
Urbom, supra note 1, at 418.
86. Frankel, supra note 1, at 23.
87. Id.
88. Id.
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pre-trial instructions, Judge Frankel instructs the jury on their right to
ask questions and the procedure to use. The jurors are told to raise
their hand if they have questions after counsel's examinations of a
witness. The bailiff gives the juror pencil and paper to write the
question and delivers the question to the judge who conducts a side bar
conference with counsel. Upon approval, the judge asks the witness the
question. The judge explains to the jury why a question is rejected. 89
Counsel then are allowed to re-examine the witness.
If such
re-examination is extensive, the jurors are given another opportunity to
ask questions. Among questions that have been rejected are those
asking for opinion testimony for which a witness is not competent,
hearsay testimony, and questions for which an improper or inadequate
foundation has been laid. 90
The Honorable Robert Landry, presiding judge in the Milwaukee
Criminal Court, follows a similar written question procedure,
except
91
that he discusses juror's questions with counsel in chambers.
The Honorable Scott 0. Wright, Chief Judge of the United States
District Court for the Western District of Missouri, has allowed juror
interrogation as standard procedure since 1988.92 In his pre-trial
instruction, Judge Wright instructs the jury on how it may ask
questions. 93 The judge warns counsel before trial that he will allow
juror interrogation. Judge Wright allows jurors to ask their questions
orally, directing them to himself.9 He determines admissibility and
then either instructs the witness to answer or explains to the jury why
the question may not be answered. On difficult questions he calls
counsel to the bench for discussion. The judge watches the lawyers as
the question is being asked; when he sees that counsel is about to object
he calls a bench conference for discussion. By this method he attempts
to alleviate the objection dilemma faced by counsel.95
An example of Judge Wright's bench conference procedure was
demonstrated during a trial for wrongful termination of employment as

89. Id.
90. Id. at 24.
91. Sixty Minutes Transcript,supra note 1, at 5.
92. Wright Interview, supra note 15. For some courts which question the
effectiveness of curative measures, see Annotation, supranote 10, at 887-88.
93. See infra text accompanying note 144 for the text of the instruction.
94. The judge believes that a written-question procedure consumes too much
time. The secrecy benefit of the written-question procedure is undermined by
the fact that jurors likely will just ask each other what the written questions
were anyway. Also, the jurors would not express themselves well in writing;
asking orally, the jurors are better able to clarify their questions immediately.
Wright Interview, supranote 15.
95. Id.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol55/iss3/7
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a police officer. A juror had inquired of the plaintiffs right to a hearing;
in that case the police department had been given inaccurate advice on
the matter so the court ruled the issue was precluded by good faith
immunity. Once the question was asked the judge called counsel
to the
bench where counsel and judge discussed how to handle the matter.
The judge refused to allow the questions asserting that it was an issue
of law.. 6
When jurors, by their questions, appear to be deviating from
relevant issues Judge Wright instructs the jury about the proper scope
of their examination. For example, in a wrongful death trial, when
jurors' questions indicated they were thinking about the plaintiffs
inheritance and tax liabilities, the judge instructed the jury they could
not consider these issues in their decision. The judge also may instruct
the jury to wait for counsel to develop some issues later in the trial.97
Judge Wright finds that the procedure is especially helpful in
complex trials where issues and facts become more confused under a
traditional procedure of presentation. He has found that trials are not
necessarily prolonged by the questions and that there has been no
noticeable bias in awards or convictions. One significant change he has
found is that jurors ask fewer questions of him during their deliberations.98
Overall, these judges have found that the juror questions asked
have been fair and relevant.9
Allowing juror interrogation is also
popular with jurors.1°°

96. Transcript, supranote 45, at 311-13.
97. Wright Interview, supra note 15.
98. Id.
99. Ranii, supranote 85, at 19, col 2. (Judge Urbom: Questions "pretty much
run the gamut, but they usually deal with substantive issues. The jurors have
a good sense of what the issues are. They almost never ask foolish questions.")
This assessment was shared by the Hon. J. Rosalyn Bell, Circuit Court Judge
in Montgomery County, Maryland: "We get some very astute questions. Some
questions have indicated there were points that the lawyers had not brought out
but should have." Id, Judge Frankel has found juror questions in his court to
be generally "thoughtful, pertinent, respectful, and to the point.... Most
frequently the jury is concerned about nuances of time, places, and distances
that have not been adequately covered by counsel." Frankel, supra note 1, at
24.
100. Sixty Minutes Transcript,supranote 1, at 5, 7. From his polls of juries
Judge Wright of the United States District Court, Western District of Missouri,
has found that jurors uniformly like the procedure. Wright Interview, supra
note 15.
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To date there have been two field studies conducted to examine the
effects of juror interrogations. 10 1 One study was conducted in the
United States District Courts of the Second Circuit by the Second
Circuit Committee on Juries. 10 2 It examined twenty-six trials, evenly
split between civil and criminal, before six judges."° In these trials
after counsel had made their opening remarks, each judge instructed the
jury on the procedure to use for asking questions in writing. As part of
the judges discouraged jurors from asking questheir instructions
°4
tions.1
The study found that four of the six judges found the procedure
useful, especially in complex cases. The judges found the procedure
useful in twelve of eighteen reported cases and unhelpful only in six of
the cases.105 Prosecutors and plaintiffs lawyers all favored the
procedure while defense counsel found the procedure more often
unhelpful.'
In eight of the twenty-six reported cases the jury asked no
questions. The jury asked one question in one case, two questions in
two cases, several in eleven cases, forty in one case, and fifty-six
questions in another case.1°7 The study found no correlation between
the number of questions asked and counsels' and judges' opinions of the
procedure. Indeed, in the case with fifty-six questions, the judge found
the questions irrelevant, whereas both counsel found the questions
helpful "in focusing their attention on the juror's concerns.l0
The second field study was conducted among the Wisconsin circuit
courts under the auspices of the Judicial Council of Wisconsin.1° The
courts used the same procedure as in the Second Circuit study. The
study examined thirty-three trials before twenty-nine judges." 0 The
study found that judges and counsel had no strong objections to the

101. Heuer & Penrod, Jurors'Participation,supra note 1; Sand & Reiss,

supra note 1. Heuer and Penrod via the American Judicature Society and the
State Justice Institute are now engaged in a more extensive national survey of
juror questions, the results of which are soon to be published. They briefly
reviewed both surveys (primarily the Wisconsin survey) in Heuer & Penrod,
Trial Lawyers, supra note 1.

102. Sand & Reiss, supra note 1, at 423.
103. Id. at 443.
104. Id.
105. Id-at 444.

106. Id
107.
108.
109.
110.

Id at 445.
Id at 446.
Heuer & Penrod, Jurors'Participation,supranote 1, at 231.
Id. at 240, 251
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procedure, but counsel found no great benefit in it either."' A total
of eighty-eight questions were asked, averaging about 2.7 per trial.
Sixty-seven percent were asked of plaintiff's or prosecution witnesses,
thirty-three percent of defendant's witnesses."2 The prosecution or
plaintiffs counsel objected eleven times, defendant's counsel twelve
times. All objections were sustained. Both counsel agreed on objections
"considerably.""'
Perhaps the most notable finding of this survey concerned the
jurors' responses to these objections. Counsel objected to seventeen
percent of all questions asked, yet the jury did not feel embarrassed or
angered by the objections and generally understood the bases for the
objections.1 4
This finding undercuts juror question opponents'
arguments that counsel risk alienating the jury by their objections. Of
course, one limited survey cannot wholly refute this argument.
Jurors felt that questioning produced more thorough evidence and
they were more satisfied with their knowledge going into deliberations.
But this did not make deliberations any easier. Jurors found the
questions "moderately helpful" in clarifying the evidence and the law
the truth, but not as helpful as some jurors had
and in finding
5
expected."

Counsel did not find juror questions helpful in uncovering important evidence, but they found them somewhat helpful in indicating
areas that needed further development. They found the feedback from
the jury useful, but not for indicating jurors' confusion over evidence or
slow the
the law. 1 For them, juror questions did not unnecessarily
117
trial process or hinder their trial performance or strategy.
Judges found that the procedure did not take up too much trial
time. The study found no correlation between judges' satisfaction and
the number of questions asked."'
Two field surveys alone are certainly an inadequate basis on which
to judge the value of juror questions; for that, further experience and
similar surveys will be necessary. Nor are the results of these surveys
dispositive of the issue; the results are mixed and, if anything, show

111. I- at 256.
112. I& at 252.
113. Id.
114. Id at 255-56
115. Id. at 252-53. Jurors in "question-asking trials" found the questions
generally less helpful than jurors in "non-question-asking trials" had expected
they might be. Id. at 253.
116. Id. at 253-54.
117. Id. at 254-55
118. Id- at 255.
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that the value of juror interrogation will vary with each case. Still,
some general conclusions may be drawn.
Juror interrogation does not necessarily hamper trial procedure and
is not necessarily cumbersome. Only one judge in the Second Circuit
survey believed the procedure was detrimental to the jury's function.
Allowing juror interrogations also did not result in excessive questions.
Most Second Circuit trials experienced 11 questions and the Wisconsin
trials averaged 2.7 questions per trial. The jury also appeared to
appreciate the procedure. The Wisconsin juries found the procedure
somewhat helpful, albeit not as helpful as anticipated. Most Second
Circuit juries were more attentive under the procedure. In neither
survey was there general disapproval of the procedure, although the
Second Circuit participants found the procedure less helpful than did
the Wisconsin participants.
In sum, there is yet no conclusive determination of the value of
juror questions. Whether to implement the procedure, on a trial or
permanent basis, will have to be up to each judge and depend on each
judge's proclivities. More time and experience is needed before an
ultimate judgment on juror interrogation can be made.
III. A SURVEY OF JUROR INTERROGATION PROCEDURE
This section will survey current use of juror questions in United
States courts, as recorded in case reporters. It will first describe the
breadth of use of juror interrogation procedure and then will describe
different procedures for implementing juror interrogation in chronologi-,
cal order from the beginning to the review of trial.
No court has yet ruled that juror interrogation is unconstitutional" 9 and the United States Supreme Court has consistently denied
certiorari to juror question cases."2 While some courts have found
authority for the procedure by analogy to a trial judge's right to

119. Yeager v. Greene, 502 A.2d 980, 981-82 (D.C. 1985). Indeed, one
scholar asserts that "the discretion of the court to allow such questioning is
undoubted." 3 J. WIGMORE, supra note 13, § 784a.
120. See United States v. Land, 877 F.2d 17 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 110 S.
Ct. 243 (1989); United States v. Callahan, 588 F.2d 1078 (5th Cir.), reh'g denied,
591 F.2d 1343, cert. denied,444 U.S. 826 (1979); United States v. Witt, 215 F.2d
580 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 887 (1954); Slaughter v. Commonwealth, 744
S.W.2d 407 (Ky. 1987), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 3174, reh'g denied, 110 S. Ct. 11
(1989); People v. Cheeks, 148 Mich. App. 758, 384 N.W.2d 783 (1985), affd, 428
Mich. 708,411 N.W.2d 159, cert. denied, 484 U.S. 967 (1987); State v. Sheppard,
100 Ohio App. 345, 128 N.E.2d 471 (1955), affd, 165 Ohio St. 293, 135 N.E.2d
340, cert. denied, 352 U.S. 910, reh'g denied, 352 U.S. 955 (1956); State v.
Barrett, 278 S.C. 414,297 S.E.2d 794 (1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1045 (1983).
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interrogate witnesses,' 21 the more common and logical basis of authority is found in the trial judge's power to administer justice in the
trial.'2 2 No court has made an analytical distinction concerning juror
interrogation between civil and criminal trials."

A. Allowing JurorQuestions
No state or federal court today absolutely forbids a judge from
At one point Georgia was the only
allowing juror interrogation."

121. See, e.g., Sparks v. Daniels, 343 S.W.2d 661, 667 (Mo. Ct. App. 1961).
122. See, e.g., DeBenedetto v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 754 F.2d 512,
516 (4th Cir. 1986) (noting that jury is not trained in law and thus cannot
exercise functions similar to judge).
123. Cf. United States v. Johnson, 892 F.2d 707, 711 (8th Cir. 1989) (Lay,
McMillian, JJ., concurring) ("In a criminal case the practice could reach
constitutional dimensions, requiring reversal of a conviction under the due
process clause.").
Judge Lay finds the constitutional dimension to this problem in language
of the United States Supreme Court in Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145
(1968). There the Court had stated that the Framers of the Constitution had
provided for the right to trial by jury as "an inestimable safeguard against the
corrupt or overzealous prosecutor and against the compliant, biased, or eccentric
judge." Id at 156. Judge Lay noted that "[w]hen the jury becomes an advocate
or inquisitor in the process, it foresakes its role of arbiter between the
government and its citizens." Johnson, 892 F.2d at 715. Judge Lay does not
cite any more specific provision or interpretation of the United States Constitution.
Judge Lay's opinion is subject to a number of criticisms. The language of
the sixth amendment alone does not clearly prohibit juror questions in criminal
trials. Rather it states: "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy
the right of speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury... ." U.S. CONST.
amend. VI. To the extent that the Framers' intent is relevant to constitutional
interpretation, Judge Lay produces no definite sign of intent against juror
questions, even though juror interrogation in English common law courts
apparently was known in colonial times. See W. BLACKSTONE, supranote 2; M.
HALE, supranote 2. Even if Judge Lay's understanding of the Framers' intent
is correct and relevant, he produces no evidence that juror interrogation
necessarily undermines such role of the jury. Indeed, the empirical evidence to
date does not support this contention. See supranotes 101-18 and accompanying text. Abuse of juror interrogation in specific trials could undermine the
fairness of a trial, as many cases show, and to this extent a party's right to due
process may be affected. This may be remedied at the appellate level for each
case. But unless the abuse is sufficiently widespread, Judge Lay's argument for
prohibiting juror interrogation seems overbroad.
124. Cf State v. Anderson, 108 Utah 130, 138, 158 P.2d 127, 130 (1945)
(Larson, J., concurring).
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state expressly prohibiting juror questions of any kind."
In 1981,
however, the Georgia Supreme Court reconsidered and it now allows
juror questions at the trial court's discretion.'2 All courts which have
considered the issue have ruled that the trial court either has discretion
to allow
juror interrogation or must allow some form of juror interroga127
tion.
Some courts which place the allowance of juror interrogation in the
discretion of the trial court, have included within that discretion the
trial court's absolute prohibition of all juror questions."
Some have
ruled that a trial judge may not absolutely prohibit questions from
jurors.

2

9

Most courts have ruled that it is solely within the trial

court's discretion whether to allow juror questions. 30
The best rule would be to allow the trial court absolute discretion
over whether it will allow or prohibit juror questions. The juror
interrogation procedure requires a diligent and conscientious judge to
carefully instruct the jury and monitor the process; restraining the jury
from excessive or prejudicial questioning requires a judge's constant
supervision and care. To force such a system upon a reluctant or
unwilling judge is to deny the process of what perhaps is its most
important element-the alert eye of the conscientious judge. To deny

125. Hall v. State, 241 Ga. 252,256,244 S.E.2d 833,837 (1978) ("jurors are
not permitted during the trial to interrogate witnesses"); Williamson v. State,
156 Ga. App. 856, 276 S.E.2d 60 (1980), rev'd, 247 Ga. 685, 279 S.E.2d 203, on
remand, 159 Ga. App. 508,285 S.E.2d 271 (1981); Stinson v. State, 161 Ga. App.
533, 536, 260 S.E.2d 407, 410 (1979) (citing Hall, 241 Ga. 252, 244 S.E.2d
833(1978)).
126. State v. Williamson, 247 Ga. 685,279 S.E.2d 203 (1981), rev'g 156 Ga.
App. 856, 276 S.E.2d 260 (1980); Pierce v. State, 158 Ga. App. 343, 343-44, 280
S.E.2d 381, 382 (1981).
127. See generally Annotation, supra note 10, at 878-80.
128. E.g., United States v. Nivica, 887 F.2d 1110,1123 (1st Cir. 1989); State
v. Taylor, 25 Ariz. App. 497, 500, 544 P.2d 714, 717 (1976); State v. Sickles, 220
Mo. App. 290, 293, 286 S.W. 432, 433 (1926) (dictum); State v. Sheppard, 100
Ohio App. 345, 390, 128 N.E.2d 471, 499 (1955), affd, 165 Ohio St. 293, 135
N.E.2d 340, cert. denied, 352 U.S. 910, reh'g denied, 352 U.S. 955 (1956).
129. E.g., Carter v. State, 250 Ind. 13, 16,234 N.E.2d 650, 652 (1968) (error
for court to give preliminary instruction that jury may not question witnesses);
Dolezal v. Goode, 433 N.E.2d 828, 833 (Ind. Ct. App. 1982) (error for court to

instruct jury that it may not question witnesses); People v. Heard, 388 Mich.
182, 187-88, 200 N.W.2d 73, 76 (1972) (error for judge, in response to counsel's
invitation of jury-question, to rule jury have no right to ask questions); People
v. Charles, 58 Mich. App. 371, 376-77, 227 N.W.2d 348, 352 (1975) (error for
judge, upon juror's request to ask question, to instruct jury that questions are
prohibited).
130. See generally Annotation, supra note 10, at 878-80.
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a willing judge the discretion to allow juror questions is to deny the
parties and the judicial system a device that may significantly improve
the litigation process and the administration of justice. At the least, it
denies modern American jurisprudence another laboratory in which to
conduct this experiment.
B.

Warning Counsel

Some judges warn counsel before trial that they will allow jurors to
One example of this is found in the trial
interrogate witnesses.'
to the opinion in Yeager v. Greene. 32
appended
memorandum
courts
When the trial court instituted its juror question procedure it sent a
memorandum to all counsel with matters on its docket informing them
of the use and specifics of the procedure. 1 3 The court then heard
challenges to the procedure outside of the jury's presence via pre-trial
motion and hearing.13
Warning counsel before trial of the use of juror interrogation,
especially when a court first implements the procedure, provides a
number of benefits. Most importantly, it adequately forewarns counsel
so that they may structure their trial strategy to accommodate the
innovation. This makes the procedure more fair for all counsel and,
thus, to the parties to the action. Such forewarning gives counsel time
to prepare sufficiently researched and developed objections to the
procedure for presentation to the court at a convenient time before trial.
A pre-trial hearing of objections allows counsels' positions to be recorded
for future reference. The judge is allowed to consider the objections well
before juror interrogation or the rush of trial begins. The judge is then
given greater time to rule on the objections and to structure, with
counsel, a mutually agreeable procedure for juror interrogation.
C. Objecting to the Procedure
As the use of juror interrogation becomes more prevalent and the
court's discretion over the procedure established, fewer objections to a
cour's implementation of the procedure will be made. Today, however,

131. E.g., Yeager v. Green, 502 A.2d 980 (D.C. 1985). Judge Wright also
warns counsel. Wright Interview, supranote 15; see supra text accompanying
note 94.
132. 502 A.2d 980 (D.C. 1980).
133. Id. at 981. The text of this memorandum is reproduced id, at 981 n.4.
134. Id at 980-81 (the motion was denied and counsel brought a writ of
mandamus to the appellate court to prevent the jury questions).
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counsel continue to object to the procedure generally" and express
alarm at having to object before the jury, thereby risking the jury's
displeasure. One way to address this alarm is to allow counsel some
time outside the presence of the jury to object to the procedure-for
example, before trial. This opportunity is given when the court
forewarns counsel of juror interrogation and holds a pre-trial hearing on
the matter. Some courts merely require the trial court to provide some
procedure for counsel to object to juror interrogation out of the presence
of the jury.1" Courts generally have been unsympathetic to counsel's
argued dilemma, asserting that counsel can find3 7some time during the
trial to make its objections away from the jury.'
D. Initiationof JurorInterrogation
Courts vary on how they initiate juror interrogations. Most courts,
in their pre-trial instructions inform the jury of its right to ask
questions and the procedure to follow." s These courts are split on
whether they discourage or encourage juror questions in their jury
instructions. 1 9

135. Indeed, some courts require objection to preserve the issue for appeal.
See generally Annotation, supra note 10, at 888-89.
136. E.g., State v. LeMaster, 137 Ariz. 159, _ 669 P.2d 592,597 (Ct. App.
1983).
137. E.g., DeBenedetto v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 754 F;2d 512, 515
(4th Cir. 1985); State v. Williamson, 247 Ga. 685, ___, 279 S.E.2d 203, 204
(1981) (20 minute period after court instructs jury when jury is in recess); State
v. Rodriguez, 107 N.M. 611, 615, 762 P.2d 898, 902 (Ct. App. 1988).
138. E.g., DeBenedetto, 754 F.2d at 515 n.1; United States v. Callahan, 588
F.2d 1078, 1086 (5th Cir.), reh'g denied, 591 F.2d 1343 (5th Cir.), cert denied,
669 P.2d at 596; State v. Taylor,
444 U.S. 826 (1979); LeMaster, 137 Ariz. at .
25 Ariz. App. 497, 500, 544 P.2d 714, 717 (1976); State v. McAlister, 167 Cal.
App. 3d 633,637, 213 Cal. Rptr. 271,273 (1985); Mars v. H. Crummey, Inc., 55
Cal. App. 573, 578-79, 204 P.2d 259, 261 (1921); State v. Williamson, 247 Ga.
685, - 279 S.E.2d 203, 204 (1981); People v. Wilds, 141 A.D.2d 395, 397, 529
N.Y.S.2d 325, 326 (1988) (recommending such procedure).
139. See, e.g., Callahan, 588 F.2d at 1086 and Yeager v. Green, 502 A.2d
980, 981 n.4 (D.C. 1985) as examples of cases which advocate discouragement.
The trial courts in United States v. Polowichak, 783 F.2d 410, 413 (4th Cir.
1986) and State v. Martinez, 7 Utah 2d 387, 389-90, 326 P.2d 102, 103 (1958)
advocate encouragement. The appellate court in Polowichak advocated
discouragement. Polowichak, 783 F.2d at 413; see also Annotation, supranote
10, at 880-82.
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4°
An example of a discouraging instruction is found in Yeager
There the trial court delivered this instruction:

Generally only the lawyers and I ask witnesses questions. If you
are concerned about whether a witness will testify about a matter that
seems important to you, usually, if you are patient, the matter will be
covered by further questions asked by me of the lawyers.
Occasionally, however, a juror feels that an important question
has not been asked. Now I am not encouraging any of you to pose
questions to the witnesses in this case. However, if it happens during
trial that you feel an important question has not been asked .... 141
Other courts do not expressly discourage juror questions in their
instructions. The trial court in State v. LeMaster142 delivered this as
part of its instruction:
Something I'll let you do is this: Ask questions of the witness. Now,
it doesn't happen very often; but it is permissible under our rules and
I like it.... I think it is really a very useful tool. Usually the lawyers
are very careful and they'll ask the questions that really get out the
essential information that you need to have; but sometimes there will
be some lingering doubt in your mind or maybe you won't quite have
heard something, you
want it explained a little and we'll give you the
143
chance to do that.
A more neutral and succinct instruction is that given by Judge Wright:
[A]fter each witness has been examined and cross examined, if you
have any questions of the witness, I'll ask you to direct the question
to me and if it's a proper question, I'll have the witness answer it. If
it's not a proper question or if
it's not admissible for some reason, I'll
1
explain to you why it is not. 4
The instruction discouraging juror questions has the virtue of
controlling its vice. A jury admonished to seek facts first from evidence
adduced by counsel and then to ask questions only to clarify or elicit
information would seem less likely to abuse the practice by interrupting
testimony or asking excessive questions. To encourage questions may
be asking too much. In the same manner, the neutral instruction

140. 502 A.2d at 1005 (from appended Order, United States v. Mitchell, No.
F-1003-84 (D.C. Super. Ct. March 12, 1985)).
141. Id
142. 137 Ariz. 159, 669 P.2d 592 (Ct. App. 1983).
143. Id at . 669 P.2d at 596.
144. Transcript, supra note 45, at 4.
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informs the jury of its right without inviting excessive questioning. Yet
it lacks the admonition and thus the greater protection against the
jury's abuse of its right.
Some courts do not inform the jury via pre-trial instruction of its
right to interrogate witnesses. In a number of older cases, the court at
some point during the trial invited the jury to ask questions. 45 This
procedure poses a number of problems. If counsel are not notified of the
procedure before trial, then the court's offering in the middle of trial is
certain to catch counsel off guard and raise all of the problems
concerning objections before the jury. Such a procedure may invite
chaos if the court does not also instruct the jurors how to ask their
questions. In addition, the procedure may catch the jury off guard; once
alerted to the opportunity to ask questions in the middle of the trial, it
is likely the jury thereafter could become more concerned with thinking
up questions than listening to testimony.
An advantage to this procedure is that it does not invite the jury to
think up questions from the beginning of trial. But this advantage will
last only until the judge first invites questions.
One court has ruled that it is not required to instruct on juror
question procedure, but counsel must request such instructions from the
court. 46 An advantage of this rule is that it gives counsel more
control over the procedure. If the rule is framed properly-namely, that
counsel must request the juror question procedure before trial and the
judge considers objections at that time-then counsel will be informed
of the use of juror questions and will be able to make objections at a
convenient time. The court could also discuss with counsel the
procedure all parties would prefer. This option is unusable, of course,
for the judge who. wishes to use the procedure regularly despite
counsel's objections.
In a number of cases, counsel had invited the jury to ask questions
of their witnesses.'4 7 In People v. Heard14 counsel had invited juror

145. E.g., Maggart v. Bell, 116 Cal. App. 306,308-09,2 P.2d 516,517 (1931);
Mars v. H. Crummey, Inc., 55 Cal. App. 573, 578-79, 204 P. 259, 261 (1922);
State v. Anderson, 108 Utah 130, 133-34, 158 P.2d 127, 128 (1945).
146. See People v. Justice, 50 Mich. App. 55,57-58,212 N.W.2d 762,763-64
(1973); cf. Cherry v. State, 258 Ind. 298, 300-01, 280 N.E.2d 818, 820 (1972)
(counsel had requested trial court to instruct jury of right to question, providing
instruction and procedure to use; trial court refused, upheld by state supreme
court which held that although court may not prohibit juror question, it is not
obligated to instruct jury on right).
147. See Superior & Pittsburgh Copper Co. v. Tomich, 19 Ariz. 182,188,165
P. 1101, 1104 (1917), affd, 250 U.S. 400 (1919), rev'd on othergrounds, 22 Ariz.
543, 199 P. 132 (1921); Strawn v. State ex rel Anderberg, 332 So. 2d 601, 601
(Fla. 1976); People v. Heard, 388 Mich. 182, 183, 200 N.W.2d 73, 74 (1972);
Lucas v. State, 381 So. 2d 140, 144 (Miss. 1980).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol55/iss3/7

28

Wolff: Wolff: Juror Questions

199o]

JUROR QUESTIONS

questions in its opening statement.'49 Opposing counsel immediately
objected and the trial court refused to allow juror questions. 15° In
Lucas v. State6l ' and Strawn v. State ex rel. Anderberg,1 52 after its
examination of the criminal defendant, counsel asked the court if it
could invite questions from the jury.1'
The prosecutor in Lucas
objected and the trial court prohibited juror questions.'5
In Strawn,
the trial court determined that counsel's action was so prejudicial that
it declared a mistrial."
In Superior & Pittsburgh Copper Co. v.
Tomich,1' counsel had invited juror questions after its presentation
of evidence.'" On appeal, counsel attempted to get a new trial on the
basis of one of the questions asked; this was denied. as
For either counsel to invite questions from the jury or request such
from the court in the presence of the jury seems very problematic. If
there is no forewarning, both opposing counsel and the court are taken
by surprise. Moreover, such a thinly-veiled attempt to curry favor with
the jury requires opposing counsel to object to preserve its client's
rights, which alienates the jury. There seems no good reason to allow
this practice. To prevent prejudice to either party, if counsel wishes to
have juror questions in a trial, he should make such a request of the
court outside the presence of the jury.
Many courts that do not require or that discourage juror interrogation hold that a trial court may not invite juror questions and may allow
interrogation only at a juror's request.159 The benefit of this procedure

148. 388 Mich. 182, 200 N.W.2d 73 (1972).
149. Id at 183, 200 N.W.2d at 74.
150. Id at 184-85, 187-88, 200 N.W.2d at 74, 76.
151. 381 So. 2d 140 (Miss. 1980).
152. 332 So. 2d 601 (Fla. 1976).
153. Lucas, 381 So. 2d at 144; Strawn, 332 So. 2d at 601.
154. Lucas, 381 So. 2d at 144 (affirmed on appeal).
155. Strawn, 332 So. 2d at 602 (mistrial affirmed on writ of prohibition).
156. 19 Ariz. 182, 165 P. 1101 (1917), affd, 250 U.S. 400 (1919), rev'd on
other grounds, 22 Ariz. 543, 199 P. 132 (1921).
157. Id. at 188, 165 P. at 1104.
158. Id Some courts also assert counsel's invitation of juror interrogation
precludes objection to the procedure generally. See Annotation, supra note 10,
at 882-83.
159. See, e.g., Ratton v. Busby, 230 Ark. 667, 678-79, 326 S.W.2d 889, 895
(1959) (court allows juror question to be made in the presence of counsel and
jury upon juror's request); Matchett v. State, 257 Ga. 785, 786, 364 S.E.2d 565,
566 (1988) (jurorhad asked the court for information about witness's testimony,
the State re-opened direct examination to ask a question and the juror orally
asked another question during that examination); Story v. State, 157 Ga. App.
490, 490, 278 S.E.2d 97, 98 (1981) (court may allow juror question only when a
juror, of his own initiative, asks the court permission to ask a question); Stinson
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is that it confronts the procedural problems of juror interrogation only
when the need arises. It prevents encouragement of juror questions by
not informing the jury of the option, as in a pre-trial instruction. Still,
once a juror requests permission to ask a question, counsel is placed in
the dilemma of having to object to the procedure in the presence of the
jury and thereby alienate the jury. If counsel does object, the court will
have to set aside time in the middle of the trial to hear counsel's
objections and to decide on an appropriate procedure (to which counsel
might also object).
Such a procedure could also undermine one of the purposes for jury
questions-allowing the jury to express its questions or confusion. If
jurors are not informed of their right to ask questions, they might
assume they may not ask questions; thus, a question in a juror's mind
might go to the jury room unresolved.
Some trial courts which disallow juror questions specifically have
instructed the jury before trial that it would not be allowed to ask
questions. 16° One obvious benefit of this instruction is that it resolves
all complications concerning juror questions. If a juror had considered
asking questions, such an instruction would at least inform the juror to
keep it to herself. If the court indicates its intention before the start of

v. State, 151 Ga. App. 533, 534, 260 S.E.2d 407, 409 (1979) (juror asked
permission to ask a question); Rudolph v. Iowa Methodist Medical Center, 293
N.W.2d 550, 555-56 (Iowa 1980) (juror asked permission of the judge in
chambers to ask a question; the judge instructed the jury on procedure for
questions the next day, after examination of the witness); Miller v. Commonwealth, 188 Ky. 435,439,222 S.W. 96,98 (Ct. App. 1920) (during deliberations,
a juror asked the court to recall a witness for questioning from jury); People v.
Stout, 116 Mich. App. 726, 732, 323 N.W.2d 532, 535-36 (1982); People v.
Charles, 58 Mich. App. 371, 377, 227 N.W.2d 348, 352 (1975) (error for court to
refuse to permit juror question on juror's request); Lucas v. State, 381 So. 2d
140, 144 (Miss. 1980) (court may allow juror question only "when some juror has
indicated that he wishes such a point clarified"); Ray v. Collins, 274 S.W. 1098,
1099 (Mo. Ct. App. 1925); State v. Barrett, 278 S.C. 414, __ 297 S.E.2d 794,
795 (1982), cert. denied,460 U.S. 1045 (1983); State v. Martinez, 7 Utah 2d 387,
389, 326 P.2d 102, 103 (1958) (allowed only when the juror had indicated her
confusion); State v. Anderson, 108 Utah 130, 134, 158 P.2d 127, 128-29 (1945)
(allowed only when the juror indicated confusion); see also Dolezal v. Goode, 433
N.E.2d 828, 833-34 (Lad. Ct. App. 1982) (court has no duty to instruct jury of its
right to question witnesses; once one question is asked, the trial court has wide
discretion in determining the procedure for asking the question).
160. See, e.g., State v. Taylor, 25 Ariz. App. 497, 499, 544 P.2d 714, 716
(1976) (allow prohibition); Carter v. State, 250 Ind. 13, 16, 234 N.E.2d 650, 652
(1968) (error to prohibit juror questions by preliminary instruction); Dolezal, 433
N.E.2d at 834 (error to prohibit juror questions); Charles,58 Mich. App. at 37879, 227 N.W.2d at 353 (error to prohibit juror questions, but reversible only if
counsel object).
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trial, counsel could make any objections before the court away from the
jury. If the court discussed with counsel whether to allow juror
questions and all parties agreed not to allow them, this instruction
would be helpful to state for the record that juror interrogation was
prohibited and would aid in preventing juror outbursts or requests to
ask questions.
This procedure could not be used, of course, in those jurisdictions
which disallow outright prohibitions of juror questions; it could be used
only in those few jurisdictions that allow prohibitions.
E.

When the JurorInterrogates

Courts vary as to when a juror may ask its question. In some
instances, usually in courts with no particular procedure for juror
interrogations, courts allow a juror to ask a question at any time during
the trial: Courts have allowed jurors to ask questions during examinations of physical evidence,'
during re-cross examination, 6 2 after
re-direct examination,"' and throughout a witness's testimony.'4
This method greatly favors juror questions over traditional trial
procedure.
The jurors become regular interrogators, indeed
super-interrogators, in that they may intervene at any point in the trial
to ask questions and even take over examination of the witness. The
value of this procedure depends on the value one finds in traditional
trial procedure. One certain problem is that if the questioning is not
closely controlled by the judge a trial could easily become chaotic. This
method also greatly encourages jurors to ask questions. The role of
counsel as examiner and presenter of evidence is greatly diminished-counsel serves as such only until a juror decides to take over that role.
So empowered, jurors would seem more likely to become advocates and
prejudicial, especially if counsel repeatedly objected to jurors' questions,
thereby thwarting their efforts to discover the truth.

161. See, e.g., State v. Bradford, 87 S.C. 546, 70 S.E. 308 (1911). While the
jury was examining the criminal defendant's hands, ajuror had asked defendant
the origin of a scar. Id. at 549, 70 S.E. at 309. In that case the burglary victim
had testified that she had bitten the perpetrator's hand. Id, at 548, 70 S.E. at
308. See also Myers v. State, 522 So. 2d 760, 762 (Miss. 1988).
162. See, e.g., Byrge v. State, 575 S.W.2d 292, 294-95 (Tenn. Crim. App.
1978).
163. See, e.g., Stout, 116 Mich. App. at 732-33, 323 N.W.2d at 535-36 (juror
had raised hand to ask a question).
164. See, e.g., Pacific Improvement Co. v. Weidenfeld, 277 F. 224, 227 (2d
Cir. 1921) (juryhad interrupted testimony with "unnecessary questions" about
35 times).
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One court required the jury to wait until each side had presented
its case before the jury could ask any questions, at which time a witness
could be recalled to the stand.'6 This procedure draws a compromise
between traditional trial procedure and a trial with juror questions by
forcing the jury to rely first on the evidence as presented by counsel.
Counsel retains the opportunity to present evidence in the manner it
chooses and only if that manner is defective-if jurors are still confused
or unsure of a fact-may jurors commence their own investigation of
witnesses. This way counsel is ensured at least initial control over
strategy in the presentation of its evidence. This method gives
preference to traditional trial procedure; only when necessary, when the
traditional procedure is inadequate, are jurors' questions sought.
This method presents a number of difficulties. For one, it is
cumbersome and inefficient. Counsel will be required to keep all
witnesses available until the jury goes into deliberations in case a juror
wishes to ask questions. This is both inconvenient to witnesses and
costly for the parties. It also may be difficult for jurors to remember
their questions and of whom they wished to ask such questions,
especially in protracted litigation. Additionally, the jury may give
greater weight to the evidence it elicits at the end of trial over the
evidence adduced by counsel. Another problem is posed by counsel's
right to cross-examination. If not allowed, counsel may suffer from
unfavorable responses or unfavorable questions asked.
Counsel
similarly suffers if she is unable to re-open her case to present rebuttal
testimony, especially if a new issue of fact is revealed by the jury's
examinations. The extent to which these difficulties are outweighed by
the benefits of this method will depend on the value a court places in
traditional trial procedure over juror questions.
Some courts have allowed the jury to recall a witness for questioning after it has gone into deliberations."
This method is essentially
similar to allowing questions after presentation of evidence except that
the problems are greater. Now counsel must keep witnesses nearby
until the jury returns with a verdict. The problem of counsel's inability
to re-examine is more tr6ubling if the jury's questions reveal where the
jury is leaning in its deliberations.

165. See People v. Knapper, 230 A.D. 487, 491, 245 N.Y.S. 245, 250 (1930)
(allowed on appeal).
166. See State v. Martinez, 7 Utah 2d 387, 389-90, 326 P.2d 102, 103 (1958)
(specific procedure not questioned; reversal on basis of questions asked). In
Martinez the jury was allowed to question a witness not called by either party.
Id This aspect of the case is described infra notes 169-71 and accompanying
text. See also Miller v. Commonwealth, 188 Ky. 435, 222 S.W. 96 (1920)
(procedure not questioned).
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A benefit of this method is that any uncertainties the jury
encounters in its deliberations may be resolved. Such a system would
work best if the court screened jurors' questions not only for admissibility but for whether the issue inquired of has been sufficiently covered
during the trial. If so, the court could send the jury back to consider the
record before it.
Courts also allow juror questions after counsel's examination of
each witness. 167 This method strikes a compromise between unregulated juror interrogation and postponing jurors' questions until after
presentation of evidence. It gives respect to traditional trial procedure
for each witness by allowing counsel to examine each witness unfettered. Any questions left unresolved after such examination may then
be asked by the jury. This method minimizes unnecessary juror
questions. 16 Respect for traditional procedure is enhanced if the court
is vigilant in screening questions that may be answered later in
counsel's presentation of evidence. Counsel may also modify its
presentation of evidence based on the kinds of questions jurors ask early
in the trial.
The preferred timing of juror interrogation of course depends on a
court's preference for traditional procedure or juror questions. The
better method likely is some variant of these methods. For example,
allowing juror questions only after counsel's examination of each witness
and allowing recall of witnesses at the end of the presentation of
evidence preserves counsel's control over the presentation of evidence
from each witness yet allows the jury the opportunity to resolve its
doubts. This would also inform counsel of the jury's leanings and of any
areas that require more development.
F. Whom the JurorInterrogates
The most radical use of juror interrogation occurred in State v.
MartineZ' 69 where the trial court had allowed jurors to question a
witness not called by either counsel.7 9 This procedure most empowers
the jury and most threatens traditional trial procedure. It seems the
problems of an adversarial jury and offending the jury by objections are

167. See DeBenedetto v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 754 F.2d 512,515 n.1
(4th Cir. 1986); Rudolph v. Iowa Methodist Medical Center, 293 N.W.2d 550,
555-56 (Iowa 1980); Yeager v. Green, 502 A.2d 980, 1001 (D.C. 1985). Judge
Urbom also advocates this method. See Urbom, supra note 1, at 420.
168. Yeager, 502 A.2d at 1001.
169. 7 Utah 2d 387, 326 P.2d 102 (1958).
170. The interrogation occurred after the jury had begun deliberations; the
jury asked over fifty questions. Id. at 389-90, 326 P.2d at 103 (reversing for
abuse of discretion).
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enhanced when jurors are allowed to choose their own witnesses. No
other court has allowed this practice; indeed,
the state appellate court
171
reversed this case for abuse of discretion.
G. The Scope of the Question
Beyond the minimal standard that the juror question asked must
seek only admissible testimony, some courts place further restrictions
on the scope of information jurors may seek. The state supreme court
in State v. Howard17 2 recommended that its courts allow only those
juror questions necessary to clarify evidence presented by counsel. 17'
The court in State v. LeMaster'7 recommended a more restrictive
scope: jurors may ask questions
only "for the purpose of clarifying the
17 5
testimony of that witness."
This restrictive standard gives the greatest deference to traditional
trial procedure by restricting the jury's interrogation to the evidence
adduced by counsel. Under this system, the jury's interrogative function
is reduced to the barest minimum-the jury may interrogate only to
clarify the evidence presented by counsel.
The federal appellate court in DeBenedetto v. Goodyear Tire &
Rubber Co. 176 recommended that juror questions be allowed only in
cases of compelling need. After reciting a number of problems involving
juror questions, the court noted that "the practice of juror questioning
is fraught with dangers."'177 Thus, it recommended that a question
should be allowed only in "compelling circumstances." 178
Exactly what "compelling circumstances" means is unclear because
the court did not apply the standard in that case. 17 9 The standard
seems to be that a judge should allow only those juror questions which
speak to a material issue of the case which has not been (or might not
be) covered by counsel in its presentation of evidence. This appears to
be the standard recommended by the state supreme court in White v.
Little'80 which stated that "it is not error for a juror to interrogate

171.
172.
173.
174.

Id.
320 N.C. 718, 360 S.E.2d 790 (1987).
Id at 726, 360 S.E.2d at 795.
137 Ariz. 159, 669 P.2d 592 (Ct. App. 1983).

175. Id at __

669 P.2d at 597.

176. 754 F.2d 512 (4th Cir. 1985).
177. Id at 516.
178. Id
179. The court noted that the questions asked were generally technical and
objective, that counsel did not object to the procedure at trial, and that the
questions were not prejudicial. Id at 517.
180. 131 Okla. 132, 268 P. 221 (1928).
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witnesses where it is clear that such interrogatories are propounded in
and for the purpose of eliciting facts overlooked by coungood faith
1
sel.

18

This standard gives less deference to traditional trial procedure
than the Howard standard because it allows the jury to interrogate
concerning matters not presented by counsel. But counsel are given the
first opportunity to develop the evidence; only when counsel have
overlooked (or, perhaps, omitted) issues material to the case will the
court rely on jurors as interrogators to develop evidence.
A standard less restrictive than DeBenedetto is that standard
recommended by the state supreme court in Lucas v. State.182 That
court recommended that a judge should allow only those juror questions
which would "aid a juror in understanding some material issue involved
in the case."'18 This standard is less restrictive because it allows
jurors to interrogate about matters already presented by counsel, so long
as the focus is material. Thus jurors assume a greater interrogative
role, rising to a level almost equal to counsel in its authority to examine
witnesses.
The least restrictive, and apparently most popular, standard allows
any question which is admissible by the rules of evidence.' 4 As part

181. Id. at 134, 268 P. at 222.
182. 381 So. 2d 140 (Miss. 1980).
183. Id. at 144; see also State v. Martinez, 7 Utah 2d 387, 389-90, 326 P.2d
102, 103 (1958) (court added that juror interrogation should only be allowed in
exceptional circumstances). Both of these courts likely envisioned a more
restrictive standard than presented here because they both required that the
juror initiate the question, see Lucas, 381 So. 2d at 144; Martinez,7 Utah 2d at
389-90, 326 P.2d at 103 (juror must indicate a wish that the point be clarified),
whereas the DeBenedetto court allowed a pre-trial instruction inviting juror
interrogation, DeBenedetto v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 754 F.2d 512, 515
n.1 (4th Cir. 1986). For the purposes of this schematology this distinction is
disregarded.
184. See, e.g., Nelson v. State, 257 Ark. 1, 4, 513 S.W.2d 496, 498 (1974)
(approves screening of questions for admissibility by the trial judge); People v.
McAlister, 167 Cal. App. 3d 633,644,213 Cal. Rptr. 271,276 (1985) (court must
screen improper questions); Dolezal v. Goode, 433 N.E.2d 828,834 (Ind.Ct. App.
1983) (judge must determine admissibility of question); Miller v. Commonwealth,
188 Ky. 435, 441, 222 S.W. 96, 99 (1920) (jury has the right to ask competent
questions); Sparks v. Daniels, 343 S.W.2d 661, 667 (Mo. Ct. App. 1961) (court
must prohibit improper questions); State v. Sickles, 220 Mo. App. 290, 293-94,
286 S.W. 432,433-34 (1926) (court has dutyto screen improper questions); State
v. Kendall, 143 N.C. 659, _ 57 S.E. 340,341 (1907) (allow questions which are
"not in violation of the general rules established for eliciting testimony"); State
v. Rodriguez, 107 N.M. 611,614,762 P.2d 898,901 (Ct. App.), reh'g denied, 107
N.M. 546, 761 P.2d 424 (1988) (court shall screen question for impropriety);
Krause v. State, 75 Okla. Crim. 381, 386-87, 132 P.2d 179, 182 (1942) (court
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of this standard one court has ruled that the jury is not restricted to
clarifying testimony elicited by counsel; rather, a juror may interrogate
on matters not raised by counsel. " This standard gives the greatest
deference to the jury as interrogators; a juror may ask any question on
any matter in the trial so long as the question
seeks testimony which is
6
admissible by the court's rules of evidence.'

H. The Form of Presentationof the Question
The area of most controversy concerns the proper form in which to
present juror questions, namely, whether they must be written or may
be asked by the juror orally.
Under a common procedure for written juror questions, the juror
writes out its question and delivers it to the court. The court holds a
bench conference with counsel to discuss objections and permissibility
of the question submitted. Once the court is satisfied that the question
is permissible (or has rephrased the question to proper form) the court
asks the question of the witness."7
This procedure significantly
preserves traditional trial procedure.
Jurors do not interrogate

must prohibit only those questions which are improper); Rojas v. Vuocolo, 142
Tex. 152, 156-58, 177 S.W.2d 962,963-64 (1944) (court should instruct jury that
it will not allow improper testimony); State v. Anderson, 108 Utah 130, 133-34,
158 P.2d 127, 128 (1945) (allow questions which are germane and not clearly
prejudicial).
185. See People v. Stout, 116 Mich. App. 726, 732-33, 323 N.W.2d 532, 536
(1982).
186. Such deference is further enhanced in those courts which allow jurors
to question witnesses not called by counsel. See supra notes 169-71 and
accompanying text.
187. This procedure was recommended in the following cases: United States
v. Polowichak, 783 F.2d 410, 413 (4th Cir. 1986); State v. LeMaster, 137 Ariz.
159,
669 P.2d 592, 597 (Ct. App. 1983); State v. Taylor, 25 Ariz. App. 497,
500,544 P.2d 714,717 (1976); McAlister, 167 Cal. App. 3d at 637,213 Cal. Rptr.
at 273; Matchett v. State, 257 Ga. 785, 786-87, 364 S.E.2d 565, 566-67 (1988);
Rudolph v. Iowa Methodist Medical Center, 293 N.W.2d 550, 556 (Iowa 1980);
Rodriguez, 107 N.M. at 614, 762 P.2d at 901; State v. Howard, 320 N.C. 718,
,

726, 360 S.E.2d 790, 795 (1987); State v. Barrett, 278 S.C. 414, --

,

297 S.E.2d

794, 795-96 (1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1045 (1983).
This procedure was followed in the following cases: United States v.
Callahan, 588 F.2d 1078, 1086 (5th Cir.), reh'gdenied, 591 F.2d 1343 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied, 444 U.S. 826 (1979); United States v. Gonzalez, 424 F.2d 1055, 1056
(9th Cir. 1970); McAlister, 167 Cal. App. 3d at 644,213 Cal. Rptr. at 276; Yeager
v. Green, 502 A.2d 980, 982 (D.C. 1985); Cheeks v. State, 266 Ind. 190, 195, 361
N.E.2d 906, 910 (1977); Rodriguez, 107 N.M. at 614, 762 P.2d at 901; Barrett,
278 S.C. at . 297 S.E.2d at 795.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol55/iss3/7

36

1990]

Wolff:
Wolff: Juror Questions
JUROR
QUESTIONS

witnesses, rather, they notify counsel what issues need further
development; by its written question the juror indicates what facts it
would like elicited. Counsel and court then may take the inquiry and
shape it into a proper and unprejudicial form. This aspect of the
procedure is especially served if counsel is allowed to follow-up on
jurors' questions. Counsel then may elicit testimony on an area the jury
wishes development in the manner that best fits counsel's trial strategy.
This procedure answers a significant criticism of juror interrogation.
It allows counsel to object to specific questions outside the presence of
the jury. Counsel, thus, are better able to screen out prejudicial
questions (or at least reshape them into less prejudicial forms) and
preserve their objection
on the record for appeal without the threat of
88
alienating the jury.
A further benefit of this procedure is that it screens out inflammatory questions. 1' Left to ask a question orally, a juror could phrase
or intone an otherwise proper question in such a way as to inflame
passions or otherwise prejudice the other jurors. If such a question is
submitted written to the court first, the court, with the aid of counsel,
may reduce the question to a more appropriate and less inflammatory
form.
One problem with this procedure is that it is cumbersome,
especially when jurors have follow-up questions. This problem was
demonstrated in State v. Barrett'9 in which the trial court initially
received and asked a juror's written question. After the witness's
response, the court asked the jury for follow-up questions, whereupon
certain jurors asked seven more questions orally. 9 1 Even if a court
could maintain the written form, this procedure could significantly
prolong a trial, especially if jurors have many questions.
A problem with the court and counsel rephrasing questions is that
court and counsel might so rephrase the question that it is no longer the
question asked by the juror. A similar incident occurred in Matchett v.
State.192 In a murder trial, a juror had informed the court that it
wanted to know how much alcohol defendants and the victim had
drunk. Rather than ask the question directly, the court allowed the
prosecutor to re-examine the witness on the issue. Unsatisfied with

188. See Yeager, 502 A.2d at 1001. It is arguable that a jury which has
asked a question particularly slanted against one side could figure out who was
responsible for having the question rejected. See defendant's argument in
Yeager. Id at 1000 n.26 (argument is unfounded).
189. See id. at 1000.
190. 278 S.C. 414,297 S.E.2d 794 (1982), cert. denied,460 U.S. 1045 (1983).
191. Id. at __ 297 S.E.2d at 795. A similar problem occurred in People v.
McAlister, 167 Cal. App. 3d 633, 637-38, 213 Cal. Rptr. 271, 273 (1985).
192. 257 Ga. 785, 364 S.E.2d 565 (1988).
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counsel's
examination, the juror interrupted and asked the question
19 3
orally.
It is also possible that court and counsel might so amend the
question to acceptable form that it is no longer comprehensible to a lay
jury (or even a lay witness). An ancillary problem is that a jury, upon
noticing the technical and legal form preferred by the court might decide
to write such questions on its own and thereby take more time in
phrasing its question than in listening to the testimony.
In one variation of the written question method, after examination
of a witness the jury retires to the jury room where it writes out its
questions. These questions are delivered to the court by the bailiff
whereupon court and counsel discuss admissibility and, if necessary,
redact the question. The jury is then returned to the courtroom and the
question asked.'9 This variation greatly reduces the chances that the
jury may be prejudiced by counsel's objections to certain questions. But
it is even more cumbersome and time-consuming than the other
procedures mentioned above, especially if the jurors have many
195
questions.
There is also a difference of opinion over whether to identify the
inquiring juror. One court has required that the identification of the
juror be concealed," while another has required the juror to write her
name below the question. 197 Concealing the juror's name helps
prevent the embarrassment (and consequent alienation) of the questioning juror,19 although indicating the juror's name would be helpful in
identifying a potentially biased juror.
Using written juror questions requires the court to decide who will
ask the questions. Usually the judge asks the question, but one court
has allowed either counsel to ask the juror's question, upon agreement

193. Id. at 786, 364 S.E.2d at 566. The state supreme court disapproved of
oral questions, but upheld the decision for lack of prejudice. Id. at 786-87, 364
S.E.2d at 566-67.
194. This was the procedure followed by the trial court in LeMaster. See
State v. LeMaster, 137 Ariz. 159, __, 669 P.2d 592, 596 (Ct. App. 1983). The
appellate court approved so long as the jury were instructed not to discuss its
questions with each other. Id. at __, 669 P.2d at 597.
195. The LeMasterappellate court raised the same criticism. Id at_ , 669
P.2d at 597.
196. See Yeager v. Green, 502 A.2d 980, 982 (D.C. 1985).
197. See State v. Rodriguez, 107 N.M. 611, 614, 762 P.2d 898, 901 (Ct.
App.), reh'g denied, 107 N.M. 546, 761 P.2d 424 (1988).
198. Accord Yeager, 502 A.2d at 1001.
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of the parties.' 9 If counsel agree to such a procedure there would
seem to be no problems with it. Should counsel fear undue influence,
counsel may object and request the judge to ask the question. It is
difficult to conceive of when counsel would allow its opponent to ask a
juror's question; the possibility of gaining a juror's favor from asking the
juror's question would seem too great. One rationale for allowing this
procedure would be if one counsel wanted to re-examine the witness and
incorporate the juror's question into its examination. But for this
reason, though, a court should ask the question itself and minimize the
prejudicial effects for either side.
Apparently the more common procedure for taking juror questions,
especially among older cases and in courts with no formal procedure, is
to allow the juror to ask its question of the witness directly.Y Under
a common formal procedure, the juror asks its question and if the court
20 1
considers the question proper it directs the witness to answer.

199. See Rudolph v. Iowa Methodist Medical Center, 293 N.W.2d 550, 556
(Iowa 1980). In Rudolph, the court asked if either counsel wanted to ask the
question. Defendant's counsel refused and plaintiffs counsel asked the question.
Id.; see also Story v. State, 157 Ga. App. 490, 490, 278 S.E.2d 97, 98 (1981).
200. The following cases allowed oral juror questions without a formal
procedure: United States v. Polowichak, 783 F.2d 410 (4th Cir. 1986) (procedure
disapproved); United States v. Witt, 215 F.2d 580 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 348 U.S.
887 (1954); Ratton v. Busby, 230 Ark. 667, 326 S.W.2d 889 (1959); O'Nellion v.
Hayes, 122 Cal. App. 329, 9 P.2d 853 (1932); Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul
R.R. v. Krueger, 23 Ill. App. 639 (1887); Slaughter v. Commonwealth, 744
S.W.2d 407 (Ky. 1987), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 3174, reh'g denied, 110 S. Ct. 11
(1989); Big Sandy & Cumberland Ry. v. Thacker, 270 Ky. 404, 109 S.W.2d 820
(1937); Stamp v. Commonwealth, 200 Ky. 133, 253 S.W. 242 (1923); Myers v.
State, 522 So. 2d 760 (Miss. 1988); State v. Sickles, 220 Mo. App. 290,286 S.W.
432 (1926); Sitrin Bros., Inc. v. Deluxe Lines, Inc., 35 Misc. 2d 1041, 231
N.Y.S.2d 943 (Cty. Ct. 1962); White v. Little, 131 Okla. 132, 268 P. 221 (1928);
Krause v. State, 75 Okla. Crim. 381, 132 P.2d 179 (1942); State v. Bradford, 87
S.C. 546, 70 S.E. 308 (1911); State v. J6ffries, 644 S.W.2d 432 (Tenn. Crim. App.
1982); Byrge v. State, 575 S.W.2d 292 (Tenn.Crim. App. 1978); Branch v. State,
4 Tenn. Crim. App. 164,469 S.W.2d 533 (1969); Rojas v. Vuocolo, 142 Tex. 152,
177 S.W.2d 962 (1944); State v. Martinez, 7 Utah 2d 387, 326 P.2d 102 (1958);
State v. Anderson, 108 Utah 130, 158 P.2d 127 (1945).
The following cases allowed juror questions as part of a formal procedure:
DeBenedetto v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 754 F.2d 512 (4th Cir. 1985);
Nelson v. State, 257 Ark. 1, 513 S.W.2d 496 (1974); Maggart v. Bell, 116 Cal.
App. 306, 2 P.2d 516 (1931); Stinson v. State, 151 Ga. App. 533, 260 S.E.2d 407
(1979) (court prohibit); People v. Stout, 116 Mich. App. 726, 323 N.W.2d 532
(1982); Sparks v. Daniels, 343 S.W.2d 661 (Mo. Ct. App. 1961).
201. See DeBenedetto, 754 F.2d at 515 n.1. Other features of the DeBenedetto court's procedure are discussed elsewhere throughout this Comment. See
also Urbom, supranote 1, at 420.
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The greatest problem with oral juror questions is that it places
counsel in the dilemma of having either to object to an improper
question, thereby alienating the juror asking the question, or to allow
an improper question. Some courts provide safety mechanisms for this
problem. To the extent that such mechanisms exist greatly determines
the validity of allowing oral juror questions.
One method many courts employ to address this problem is to
require the trial court to interrupt an improper question without need
for counsel's objection and to direct the witness not to answer. 2 One
justification given for this rule is based on the theory that allowing juror
questions is permissible as part of a trial court's inherent powers in the
administration of justice. When a juror asks a question it represents
the court and the court gives it the authority of counsel; thus, in that
the court empowers the jury, the court has the duty to regulate the
power given. This regulative duty arises from the empowering and thus
does not need the request of counsel to be invoked.0 3 Other courts,
mostly in older decisions, assert that the court has no duty to intervene
against improper questions and that counsel must object to preserve the
issue for appeal.'
One advantage of requiring counsel to object to improper questions
is that it gives the court the opportunity to issue curative instructions,

202. See People v. McAlister, 167 Cal. App. 3d 633,643,213 Cal. Rptr. 271,
276 (1985) (applied in criminal cases); Myers, 522 So. 2d at 762; Sparks, 343
S.W.2d at 667; Sickles, 220 Mo. App. at 293-94,286 S.W. at 433-34; Howard,320
N.C. at 725-28, 360 S.E.2d at 794-95; Krause, 75 Okla. Crim. at 387, 132 P.2d
at 182; State v. Barrett, 278 S.C. 414, _ 297 S.E.2d 794, 796 (1982), cert.
denied, 460 U.S. 1045 (1983).
203. Sparks, 343 S.W.2d at 667. A similar rationale, based on the court's
duty of ensuring a fair and impartial trial, was given in Sickles, 220 Mo. App.
at 293-94, 286 S.W. at 433-34.
204. See Prather v. Nashville Bridge Co., 286 Ala. 3, 5, 236 So. 2d 322, 324
(1970); Mars v. H. Crummey, Inc., 55 Cal. App. 573, 578-79, 204 P. 259, 261
(1921); North Chicago St. R.R. v. Burgess, 94 Ill. App. 337, 341 (1901); Chicago
Hansom Cab Co. v. Havelick, 131 Ill. 179,22 N.E. 797 (1889); Louisville Bridge
& Terminal Co. v. Brown, 211 Ky. 176, 183, 277 S.W. 320, 322-23 (Ct. App.
1925); Stamp v. Commonwealth, 200 Ky. 133, 142-44, 253 S.W. 242, 246 (Ct.
App. 1923); State v. Crawford, 96 Minn. 95, 100-01, 104 N.W. 822, 824 (1905);
Ray v. Collins, 274 S.W. 1098, 1099 (Mo Ct. App. 1925); State v. Rodriguez, 107
N.M 611, 615, 762 P.2d 898, 902 (Ct. App. 1988).
The Maris and Crawford cases are noteworthy. In Maris,the appellate court
asserted that the argument that counsel was in the dilemma of offending the
jury or allowing improper questions was groundless. Maris,55 Cal. App. at 57879, 204 P. at 261. The Crawford court asserted that the possibility of counsel
offending the jury by objecting was irrelevant. Crawford, 96 Minn. at 100-01,
104 N.W. at 824.
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correct any errors, and implement procedural safeguards, thereby
precluding the need for reversal on appeal. 2°
The degree of this
advantage
varies
with
the
effectiveness
of
curative
instructions and the
20
like.
One court has used a procedure which compromises between these
two positions. In People v. Stout2 7 defense counsel objected to a
juror's question, the jury was removed, counsel argued its objection, the
jury was returned, and the court made its ruling.2°0 This procedure
alerts the court to objections counsel may have (which allows curative
measures), yet conceals from the jury the particulars of the objection.
The jury still knows who objected, but at least it does not know why.
If the court explains to the jury why a question was rejected, juror bias
may be reduced further. This procedure still raises the problem of
counsel having to object in front of the jury.
One great benefit of oral juror question procedure is that it is
efficient. The juror asks its question, the judge screens for impropriety,
and the witness responds. Follow-up questions are also easier to
accommodate. Hearing the juror ask the question also better reveals
any underlying juror bias. The procedure significantly undermines
traditional trial procedure; the jury is given equal freedom as counsel
to interrogate witnesses (especially if a court allows the jury to call
witnesses not examined by counsel).
There are many criticisms of oral juror questions.
There is no
procedure by which to keep inflammatory questions from reaching the
other jurors. Once a juror states its pointed question the damage is

205. This rationale was stated in ChicagoHansom Cab, 22 N.E. at 797, and
was implicit in Ray, 274 S.W. at 1099 (counsel should have objected or requested
curative instruction).
206. Some courts assert that curative instructions effectively address the
error. See Maggart v. Bell, 116 Cal. App. 306, 308-09, 2 P.2d 516, 517 (1931)
(juror inquired about defendant's insurance); Big Sandy & Cumberland Ry. v.
Thacker, 270 Ky. 404, 406-07, 109 S.W.2d 820, 821 (1937) (juror asked about
plaintiff's attempts to settle); Kelly v. Commonwealth Ins. Co., 23 N.Y. Super.
Ct. 82, 99 (1862) (juror inquired about insurance); Espinoza v. State, 73 Tex.
Crim. 237, 241, 165 S.W. 208, 210 (1914) (juror asked why defendant did not
testify).
Some courts assert curative instructions are ineffective. See Strawn v.
State ex rel. Anderburg, 332 So. 2d 601, 606 (Fla. 1976) (counsel had asked jury
for questions without court permission); Rojas v. Vuocolo, 142 Tex. 152, 156-57,
177 S.W.2d 962, 963-64 (1944) (juror inquired about defendant's insurance).
207. 116 Mich. App. 726, 323 N.W.2d 532 (1982).
208. Id at 732, 323 N.W.2d at 535-36.
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done.'
But although written questions remove the juror's ability to
make its statement in court, there is nothing to ensure the juror will not
make the same statement during deliberations, thereby producing the
same prejudicial effect. Indeed, hearing the juror's question in court
could alert counsel and court to a biased juror.
The written question procedure better handles counsel's objections
without prejudicing counsel in the jury's eyes. Even in a court which
requires the judge to screen questions, a judge can only be so vigilant
and might not see the impropriety counsel sees. Even if counsel is not
required to object to preserve the issue for appeal, most courts require
the improper question to have been prejudicial to a party's case to merit
reversal. 210 This is a difficult standard for the appellant to meet,
especially before an appellate court which did not experience the
incident directly. Thus, the oral question procedure will be fair to
objecting counsel only to the extent of the trial judge's perceptiveness.
Resting trial fairness upon the perceptions of one person is precarious
at best.
An example of this problem is found in Stinson v. State.2 11 That
case concerned a criminal trial for possession of marijuana. Defendant
was a passenger in a car in which the marijuana was discovered. After
the detective who discovered the drug testified, the following exchange
ensued:
Juror:

Court:
Juror

Court:

[W]hen you opened the sack [in which the detective found
the drug] could you explain what [defendant's] reaction...
was, as if the man knew it was there, or was it a surprise
or what?...
Is your question was it in view if he had looked?
Was it in view and did he act as if he knew what was there
or if it was a surprise or what? [The court allowed the
question; Defense counsel objected that the detective's
opinion as to defendant's reaction was inadmissable]
Well, ladies and gentlemen of the jury, of course, the
jurors-it's the discretion of the Court that they can ask
questions, but they are subject to the same rules of evidence
and objections as if an attorney had asked them. However,

209. See DeBenedetto v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 754 F.2d 512, 516
(4th Cir. 1986); Yeager v. Green, 502 A.2d 980, 1000 (D.C. 1985); State v.
Martinez, 7 Utah 2d 387, 390-91, 326 P.2d 102, 104 (1958) (Worthen, J.,
concurring).
Judge Urbom asserts that this problem is exaggerated, that "[tihe juror
merely asks a question; a question, however violative of the rules of evidence,
has scant potential in itself for mischief." Urbom, supra note 1, at 419.
210. See infranote 239 and accompanying text.
211. 151 Ga. App. 533, 260 S.E.2d 407 (1979).
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it's the court's opinion., that [witness] can say whether
the bag of marijuana, as he opened it, was in view-plain
view of the person in the passenger side had he looked and
what the passenger's reaction was at the time....
Witness: Whenever he was sitting there he made no reaction whatsoever whenever we walked up to the car or when we pulled
it out of the brown paper sack. He just more or less turned
his head and looked and that was all the reaction he made.
Court:
What reaction was there at the time of arrest, if any.
Witness: He never said a word. [Objection from defense counsel]
Court:
I asked what his reaction was and, of course, he has a right
to remain silent and it should not be held against him. You
ladies and gentlemen will not hold it against him, the fact
that he made-didn't say anything, so to speak. We don't
even 2know whether he was given an opportunity or
21

not.

The appellate court relied on this exchange as support for prohibiting juror questions altogether, pointing out the juror's improper
questions and the trial court's exacerbation of the damage.2 13 Possibly

had the juror written out the question this exchange would not have
occurred. Also, had the trial judge been more vigilant in his scrutiny
this exchange could have been better-controlled.
It seems that oral questions could more likely excite the jury and
turn jurors into advocates. Jurors who want to become advocates will
be encouraged seeing their peers successfully interrogate the witness;
not wanting to miss out on such an opportunity they will want to join
in the questioning.
Another problem with jurors asking their own questions is that a
juror, not educated in the rules of evidence, may be unable to phrase a

question properly. This problem arose in Branch v. State.214 In that
murder case defendant argued self-defense, claiming the victim had
wielded a knife. A juror wanted to know where the knife was but
phrased the question in such a way as to require hearsay. 215 The trial

court intervened and instructed the juror and defendant against using
hearsay testimony. Despite many attempts, the juror and defendant
were unable to choose the correct words.
This problem may be addressed if the court intervenes and asks the
question itself in proper form. This solution requires a skillful judge;

212. Id at 535, 260 S.E.2d at 409.
213. Id. at 536-37, 260 S.E.2d at 410.
214. 4 Tenn. Crim. App. 164,

.

469 S.W.2d 533, 534 (1969).

215. Id
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1990

43

860

Missouri Law Review, Vol. 55, Iss. 3 [1990], Art. 7

MISSOURI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 55

one who can phrase the question to satisfy the jury and both counsel
and to elicit a suitable response from the witness.

I. Explanation of Rejected Question
One method for addressing potential juror prejudice resulting from
a rejected question is for the court to explain to the jury why a question
has been rejected." 6 The trial court in Yeager v. Greene 17 employed
this method by delivering to the jury, upon rejection of a question, the
following specific instruction:
Ladies and Gentlemen, I have decided not to ask this witness a
question written out by one of the jurors because the question is not
legally proper. I do not know what the answer to the question would
have been, and I must direct the juror who submitted the question not
to guess or speculate about the answer because it is not relevant to

your consideration of this case. That juror must put the question out
of his or her mind and may218not consider it or discuss it with other
jurors during deliberations.
Although the principle of explaining why a question was rejected is
valid, issuing such a rigid instruction would seem ineffective if not more
damaging. Because the question was written and not revealed to the
other jurors, it seems the first thing the jurors would do upon entering
deliberations would be to find out what was the question and then to
speculate why it was rejected. It is questionable whether "not legally

proper" will satisfy a juror's curiosity. If many questions are rejected for
various reasons, this instruction will begin to lose its value after a few
recitations. Eventually, the jury will figure out that it is a stock
response and likely will ignore it and speculate among themselves the
true reason for rejection and what was the forbidden answer.
Explaining to jurors why a question has been rejected would help
to reduce jury speculation, whether the question was written or oral.
For example, if a juror inquires about the defendant's insurance in a
personal injury action or inheritance or taxes in a wrongful death action
then it would resolve some questions in the jurors' minds if the court
explained that the jury is not supposed to consider such matters.1
If a juror asks why a criminal defendant did not testify it could be

216. See, e.g., Yeager v. Green, 502 A.2d 980, 1003 (D.C. 1985); Story v.
State, 157 Ga. App. 490, 490, 278 S.E.2d 97, 98 (1981); see also, Urbom, supra
note 1, at 418.
217. 502 A.2d 980 (D.C. 1985).
218. Id at 1006.
219. In this case the Yeager instruction could be appropriate.
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helpful to explain that a defendant has a constitutional right not to
testify and that the State must prove its case against the defendant.' °
Such an explanation would not necessarily prevent speculation by the
jury, but it is an effort, and certainly does not hurt.

J. Re-examination of the Witness
Some courts expressly allow counsel to re-examine the witness after
juror interrogation. 221 Of these courts, some restrict the scope of
counsel's re-examination to the subject-matter raised by the juror
question and the witness's answers; others do not.2
Allowing counsel to re-examine a witness after juror interrogation
favors traditional trial procedure, unrestricted examination more so,
than examination restricted to the subject-matter of the juror question.
The juror questions alert counsel to matters that may need further
development with such development (to the extent it is not achieved by
the juror question itself) achieved by the traditional procedure of
evidence presentation. Re-examination serves a function similar to
cross-examination. Counsel are given the opportunity to develop a
witness's response beyond the scope of a juror's question; in this way
counsel may mitigate any prejudicial effects of a witness's answer or a
juror's question. This function becomes more important when the jury
is more likely to be adversarial in its interrogation.
The problem with this procedure is that it consumes time. Counsel
and jury could examine and re-examine for many rounds, especially in
a complex trial with recalcitrant witnesses. The trial court will have to
terminate the examination at some point. Thus, the effectiveness of the
procedure requires a conscientious judge who can determine when the
examination has become repetitive.

220. In this case the Yeager instruction might not be adequate. Judge
Wright offered these hypothetical cases as examples of the need for personalized
explanations. Wright Interview, supra note 15.
221. See DeBenedetto v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 754 F.2d 512,515 n.1
(4th Cir. 1985) (oral question); State v. LeMaster, 137 Ariz. 159,
669 P.2d
592, 597 (Ct. App. 1983) (written question); Rudolph v. Iowa Methodist Medical
Center, 293 N.W.2d 550, 556 (Iowa 1980). Judge Urbom also recommends this
procedure. See Urbom, supra note 1, at 420.
222. One court which so restricted was LeMaster, 137 Ariz. at . 669 P.2d
at 597. Courts which did not so restrict include: DeBenedetto, 754 F.2d at 515
n.1; Rudolph, 293 N.W.2d at 556.
..
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K. Objections
A contentious issue arising from juror interrogation concerns the
dilemma faced by counsel who wish to object to the juror question
procedure or to specific questions but who do not wish to alienate the
jury. For reasons discussed below, objections to specific questions pose
greater problems than objections to the use of juror questions generally.
Counsel faces this objection dilemma respecting juror question
procedure in courts which require objection to preserve the matter for
appeal.'
This problem is greater when a court holds counsel's failure
to object to the procedure at the beginning of trial to be implicit consent
to the procedure, thus barring an objection later in the trialY"

223. See, e.g., DeBenedetto, 754 F.2d at 515 (counsel could have objected to
procedure at some point in trial outside of presence of jury); Coffey v. Sutton,
175 Ill. App. 331, 342 (1912) (must object at time or in motion for new trial);
Rudolph,293 N.W.2d at 555 (counsel had objected in post verdict motion for new
trial); State v. Williamson, 247 Ga. 685, 686, 279 S.E.2d 203, 204 (1981) (could
have objected after court's instruction to jury when jury in recess); State v.
Rodriguez, 107 N.M. 611, 615, 762 P.2d 898, 902 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, 107
N.M. 546, 761 P.2d 424 (1988) (counsel could have requested bench conference
or hearing without presence of jury); see People v. McAlister, 167 Cal. App. 3d
633, 643, 213 Cal. Rptr. 271, 275-76 (1985) (counsel objected after court
instruction to jury); Sitrin Bros., Inc. v. Deluxe Lines, Inc. 35 Misc. 2d 1041,
1042, 231 N.Y.S.2d 943, 945 (1962) (counsel objected after jury retired); White
v. Little, 131 Okla. 132, 133, 268 P. 221, 222 (1928) (counsel objected in motion
for new trial); Krause v. State, 75 Okla. Crim. 381, 386, 132 P.2d 179, 181-82
(1942) (counsel objected after sixth jury question). See generally Annotation,
supra note 10, at 889-90.
Conversely, some courts require objection when the trial court prohibits the
use of juror questions. See, e.g., Dolezal v. Goode, 433 N.E.2d 828, 833 (Ind. Ct.
App. 1982) (counsel objected after court instructed jury it might not ask
questions); People v. Wesley, 148 Mich. App. 758, 761, 384 N.W.2d 783, 784
(1985), affd, 428 Mich. 708,411 N.W.2d 159, cert. denied, 484 U.S. 967 (1987);
People v. Charles, 58 Mich. App. 371, 379, 227 N.W.2d 348, 353 (1975).
224. One court has held that if counsel invites juror questions and then does
not immediately object to a specific question, the procedure is presumed to have
caused no prejudice to such party. Superior & Pittsburgh Copper Co. v. Tomich,
19 Ariz. 182, 188, 165 P. 1101, 1104 (1917), affd, 250 U.S. 400 (1919), rev'd on
other grounds, 22 Ariz. 543, 199 P. 132 (1921). Another court has made the
sensible ruling that counsel who consents to a juror's question may not later
object to the procedure. Singleton v. State, 48 Okla. Crim. 276, 286, 291 P. 145,
149 (1930). One court has ruled that counsel's failure to object to the procedure
constitutes counsel's implicit consent to the procedure, thereby barring appeal.
See Wallace v. Keystone Auto. Co., 239 Pa. 110, 119, 86 A. 699, 701-02 (1913)
("tacit permission"). See generally Annotation, supra note 10, at 882-83.
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Counsel faces less of a problem in courts which do not require objection
to preserve the matter for appeal.2 "
A requirement of procedural objections made to the trial court is
beneficial for giving the trial judge, who has the greatest familiarity
with the needs and problems of the trial, the opportunity to respond to
the objection and attempt a remedy. This increases judicial efficiency
by ensuring that only one trial will be necessary (by preventing the need
for a new trial) and reducing the number of appeals.
As discussed above, the problem of procedural objections can be
addressed via a pre-trial conference. Counsel may be forewarned of the
use or prohibition of juror questions and in conference the court may
hear counsels' objections, establish a record for appeal, or even tailor the
juror interrogation procedure to a mutually agreeable form.'
Counsel's dilemma is most acute concerning objections to specific
Because such objections cannot be
questions and to juror bias.
anticipated counsel faces the dilemma during trial and before the jury.
For evidentiary objections, this problem is greatest in courts which
require objections to preserve the matter for appeal.2 2 Even in courts

225. See, e.g., Ratton v. Busby, 230 Ark. 667, 679, 326 S.W.2d 889, 896
(1959) (counsel had been forewarned of jury question but did not object until
motion for new trial on third day of trial); State v. Barrett, 278 S.C. 414,
297 S.E.2d 794, 796 (1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1045 (1983) (court had
improperly allowed oral questions; counsel objected after seventh oral question
in motion for mistrial); State v. Martinez, 7 Utah 2d 387, 326 P.2d 102 (1958);
cf.Scheel v. State, 350 So. 2d 1120, 1121 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1977) (appellant
must prove jury question denies fair trial).
226. The pre-trial conference method was used in Yeager v. Green, 502 A.2d
980 (D.C. 1985), where immediate appeal was had via writ of mandamus.
227. The following courts have required objections be made to preserve the
matter for appeal: Prather v. Nashville Bridge Co., 286 Ala. 3, 5, 236 So. 2d
322, 324 (Ala. 1970); Mars v. H. Crummey, Inc., 55 Cal. App. 573, 578, 204 P.
259, 261 (1922); Louisville Bridge & Terminal Co. v. Brown, 211 Ky. 176, 183,
277 S.W. 320, 322-23 (1925); Stamp v. Commonwealth, 200 Ky. 133, 143, 253
S.W. 242, 246 1923); State v. Crawford, 96 Minn. 95, 100, 104 N.W. 822, 824
(1905); Sparks v. Daniels, 343 S.W.2d 661, 666-67 (Mo. Ct. App. 1961) (trial
court ruled objection must be made once question asked; appellate court
reversed); Ray v. Collins, 274 S.W. 1098, 1099 (Mo. Ct. App. 1925) (counsel could
have avoided offending juror); Rodriguez, 107 N.M. at 615, 762 P.2d at 902
(counsel could have requested bench conference or hearing without presence of
jury); Singleton v. State, 48 Okla. Crim. 276, 286, 291 P. 145, 149 (1930); see
also Annotation, supra note 10, at 889-90.
The following courts did not require immediate objection to preserve the
matter for appeal: Ratton, 230 Ark. at 682, 326 S.W.2d at 898 (counsel did not
object until motion for new trial); People v. McAlister, 167 Cal. App. 3d 633, 643,
213 Cal. Rptr. 271, 276 (1985) (applied in criminal cases); Myers v. State, 522
So. 2d 760, 762 (Miss. 1988); Sparks, 343 S.W.2d at 666-67 (trial court ruled
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which do not require objections, the problem arises because counsel is
not guaranteed a reversal on appeal. Thus, counsel's dilemma is to
object to a question to prevent prejudice but risk juror alienation or
avoid juror alienation by not objecting and hope for no prejudice or a
remedy on appeal.
To a degree this problem is resolved by requiring written juror
questions. m Despite this device, jurors could figure out who objected,
especially with pointed questions, and discuss among themselves in
deliberations who asked what questions.
Judge Wright, Chief Judge of the United States District Court for
the Western District of Missouri, allows oral questions and attempts to
resolve this dilemma in a three-step process. He scrutinizes the jurors'
questions himself and rejects outright those he deems impermissible.
On what he perceives to be close questions, Judge Wright calls counsel
to the bench for objections and conference. For other questions, he
watches counsel during juror interrogation and as soon as he sees
counsel about to object he calls a bench conference.=
Judge Wright's method is valuable for focusing objections on the
judge; throughout the trial the jury sees only the judge calling conferences and screening questions. ° This method works best with
vigilant judges who pay close attention to the progression of the trial
and who are sensitive to counsels' concerns. Most objections could be
covered through the first two steps of Judge Wrights method. The third
step addresses borderline questions. It is imperfect because a judge
cannot always catch counsel as they are about to object. It also does not
catch those questions to which counsel do not overtly object for fear of
alienating the jury. But for oral questions it is probably the best
method.
Another possible way to address the objection dilemma for oral
juror questions would be to install a mechanical device which would
allow counsel to indicate its objections to the judge out of the jury's
sight. There is a question, though, whether the expense of such a
system would be justified.

objection must be made once question asked; appellate court reversed); State v.
Howard, 320 N.C. 718, 360 S.E.2d 790, 794-95 (1987); Krause, 75 Okla. Crim.
at 387, 132 P.2d at 182; Barrett, 297 S.E.2d at 796 (S.C. 1982); see also
Annotation, supra note 10, at 891-92.
228. This method was recommended in State v. LeMaster, 137 Ariz. 159,
__, 669 P.2d 592, 597 (Ct. App. 1983).
229. Wright Interview, supra note 15.
230. It is arguable, though, that a judge cannot always notice counsel and
that the jury could sometimes figure out which counsel prompted the conference
(if the judge saw it the jury probably saw it too).
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Similar problems arise with respect to juror bias. Sometimes a
juror's questions may reveal bias. Counsel is then faced with the
dilemma of objecting to the biased juror and thereby suffering that
juror's alienation if unsuccessful or suffering the juror's possible bias by
not objecting. Concerning juror bias courts have generally required that
counsel object either immediately or at some point during the trial to
preserve the matter for appeal. 231
Requiring an objection at trial makes sense. Immediate objection
allows a court to attempt a curative measure to address potential
bias. 2 Because the trial judge is more familiar with the jurors and
the progress of the trial, the trial judge, not the appellate court, is in the
best position to determine whether a juror is biased. Also, it is unfair
for objecting counsel to wait and determine whether the trial is going
against its client before objecting to a biased juror.
Counsel's dilemma can be addressed if the court provides a time
outside the presence of the jury for counsel to make its objection. This
was done in State v. Jeffries' where a juror had indicated possible
bias by remarking "if I had somebody working for me and they had
some offense committed . . . ."234 At the next jury recess counsel was
allowed to move for a mistrial.'
L. Appellate Review
Appellate courts have taken a variety of approaches to reviewing
juror question cases. For some courts, especially when juror questions
are first used, certain actions are deemed outright reversible error such
2
as the trial judge's failure to screen sua sponte prejudicial questions, 6

231. Courts which have required immediate objection include: Chicago
Hansom Cab Co. v. Havelick, 131 Ill. 179,22 N.E. 797 (1889); North Chicago St.
R.R. v. Burgess, 94 Ill. App. 337, 341 (1901) (counsel did not object until motion
for new trial); Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul R.R. v. Krueger, 23 Ill App. 639,
643 (1887) (rulingthatfailure to object and allowingtrial to continue constitutes
waiver). One court which allowed objection later in the trial was Big Sandy &
Cumberland Ry. v. Thacker, 270 Ky. 404, 407, 109 S.W.2d 820, 821 (9137)
(counsel moved to discharge jury after presentation of evidence); see also
Annotation, supra note 10, at 883-85.
232. Chicago Hansom Cab Co., 131 Ill. at 181, 22 N.E. at 797.
233. 644 S.W.2d 432 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1982).
234. I& at 434.
235. Id at 434-35 (motion was denied; reversed on appeal).
236. E.g., State v. Sickles, 220 Mo. App. 290,292-93,286 S.W. 432,433 (Mo.
Ct. App. 1926) (juror inquired about the criminal defendant's nationality and
asked how long he had lived in the United States; counsel did not object); Rojas
v. Vuocolo, 142 Tex. 152, 156, 177 S.W.2d 962, 964 (1944) (juror inquired of
defendant's insurance; counsel did not object).
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allowing oral questions, z 7 and prohibiting juror interrogation.'
Generally, courts will not reverse a trial court decision unless the
appellant can prove prejudice.'
How much prejudice must be shown
will vary with the appellate court's opinion of juror questions (the less
favored the procedure the less prejudice need be shown). Examples of
prejudicial error or abuse of discretion include cases where the jury at
the court's invitation had asked over fifty questions and interrogated a
witness not called by either counsel;" ° where jurors had asked
biased, prejudicial, and argumentative questions and "assumed the role
of prosecutor;"'241 and where a juror had asked the24 victim why it took
so long to identify the criminal defendant in court. 2

237. Story v. State, 157 Ga. App. 490, 490, 278 S.E.2d 97, 98 (1981).
238. E.g., People v. Heard, 388 Mich. 182, 188, 200 N.W.2d 73, 76 (1972);
cf. Cherry v. State, 258 Ind. 298, 300, 280 N.E.2d 818, 820 (Ind. 1972) (not error
for court to refuse to instrict jury on right); Dolezal v. Goode, 433 N.E.2d 828,
833 (Ind. Ct. App. 1982); People v. Charles, 58 Mich. App. 371, 379,227 N.W.2d
348, 353 (1975) (if counsel does not object to prohibition at trial and there is no
prejudice, then the appellate court will not reverse).
239. See, e.g., United States v. Gray, No. 89-2053 (8th Cir. March 5, 1990)
(1990 WL 19093); United States v. Polowichak, 783 F.2d 410, 413 (4th Cir.
1986); DeBenedetto v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 754 F.2d 512, 517 (4th Cir.
1985); State v. LeMaster, 137 Ariz. 159, __. 669 P.2d 592, 598 (Ct. App. 1983);
People v. McAlister, 167 Cal. App. 3d 633, 643, 213 Cal. Rptr. 271, 272 (1985);
O'Nellion v. Haynes, 122 Cal. App. 329, 9 P.2d 853 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1932);
Scheel v. State 350 So. 2d 1120, 1121 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1977) (appellant must
show the procedure denied him a fair trial); Matchett v. State, 257 Ga. 785, 787,
364 S.E.2d 565, 567 (1988); Rudolph v. Iowa Methodist Medical Center, 293
N.W.2d 550, 555 (Iowa 1980); People v. Stout, 116 Mich. App. 726, 733, 323
N.W.2d 532,536 (1982); Myers v. State, 522 So. 2d 760,762 (Miss. 1980); Smith
v. State, 81 Okla. Crim. 412, 419, 165 P.2d 381, 385 (1946); White v. Little, 131
Okla. 132, 134, 268 P. 221, 222-23 (1928); Byrge v. State, 575 S.W.2d 292, 295
(Tenn. Ct. Crim. App. 1978) (juror asked question without permission of the
court).
The Eighth Circuit in Gray has described the policy behind review for
prejudice as follows:
A trial is a search for truth, subject to the burdens of proof imposed
upon the parties and the requirements prescribed by the Constitution
and the law. Trial judges must have substantial latitude in overseeing this search and they should be reversed on matters of trial
procedure only when prejudice to one party or the other affects the
outcome of the litigation.
Gray, 1990 WL 19093, at 2.
240. State v. Martinez, 7 Utah 2d 387, 389, 326 P.2d 102, 103 (1958)
(counsel had not objected at trial).
241. Krause v. State, 75 Okla. Crim. 381, 132 P.2d 179 (1942).
242. People v. Wilds, 141 A.D.2d 395,397,529 N.Y.S.2d 325,326-27 (1988).
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One court has developed a specific test for determining prejudice
from juror interrogation.2 " The court examines three factors: the
degree to which counsel was unable to object to improper testimony for
fear of offending the jury; the degree to which a juror has lost its
objectivity and become biased; the degree to which there was tension or
antagonism between the juror and a witness.2'
By balancing these
factors the court determines the prejudice suffered by appellant.
IV.

MODEL JUROR INTERROGATION PROCEDURE

Drawing from the variety of juror interrogation procedures used by
United States courts as described in Section III, this section provides a
model integrated juror interrogation procedure. This model adopts those
procedures that most effectively enhance the jury's role in a trial for the
purpose of improving juror understanding of the facts in issue, but
defers to counsel's strategy concerns when such do not interfere with the
jury's need to know. The model strikes a balance between the desire for
full juror information and the need for substantial trial fairness.
A. Pre-trialWarning to Counsel and Hearingfor Objections
When a judge first implements a juror question procedure the judge
should notify all counsel with cases pending. Such notification should
be given reasonably early to allow counsel adequate time to develop
objections. The judge then should hold a pre-trial hearing on the matter
to hear and rule on any objections or even to fashion an interrogation
procedure satisfactory to all parties.
Such a notice and hearing allows counsel to object to juror
questions outside the presence of a jury and allows the judge to consider
fully-developed objections from counsel. Pre-trial hearings allow counsel
to appeal the issue immediately; the appellate courts then may decide
on the permissibility of juror questions before any trial begins. Upon
the appellate court's decision, the trial judge may conduct the trial
either with juror questions sanctioned by the superior courts or without
juror questions forbidden by those courts.
Eventually, of course, as the appellate courts address all counsels'
objections pre-trial notice and hearing will become unnecessary. But
when juror interrogation is first attempted, it is helpful to address
objections to the procedure at the beginning.

243. People v. McAlister, 167 Cal. App. 3d 633, 213 Cal. Rptr. 271 (1985).
244. Id. at 645, 213 Cal. Rptr. at 277.
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B. Pre-trialInstructionto the Jury
The jury should be informed of its right to ask questions and the
proper procedure to follow. Uninformed jurors might not ask questions
troubling them and the whole purpose of juror questions is lost. To
ensure orderliness of interrogation, the court must inform the jurors
when and how to ask their questions.
Juror interrogation should supplement traditional evidentiary
procedure; therefore, the court should instruct the jury that its primary
duty is to decide the facts from the evidence presented by counsel. The
court should instruct the jury that at the end of counsel's examination
of each witness the judge will ask for questions from the jury. A juror
who has a question should raise his hand and when recognized by the
judge ask the question. The judge will determine whether the question
is permissible. If it is, the judge will allow the witness to answer. If
impermissible, the judge will either rephrase it or will tell the jury why
the question was rejected. Such an instruction may read as follows:
During the trial each side will present witnesses and evidence for
what they believe are the facts in this case. From these presentations
you must decide for the court what are the true facts in this case and
give us your verdict. After each side has questioned a witness I will
ask you if you have any questions. If you are confused about
something the witness said, raise your hand and I will let you ask
your question. Sometimes your question will be legally improper. If
so, I will either try to rephrase it or will tell you why you cannot ask
it.
C. Allow JurorQuestions After the Examination of Each Witness
The court should allow juror interrogation of a witness immediately
after both counsel have examined the witness. Taking juror questions
after the examination of each witness provides a compromise between
counsel's and the jury's concerns. Counsel gets to control each witness's
testimony and the jurors get to ask their questions when the questions
are still fresh in their minds and the witnesses are still available.
D. Allow Any ProperQuestion
Jurors' interrogation should be limited only by the rules of evidence.
The purpose for juror questions is to enhance the jury's knowledge of the
case. So long as the inquiry is proper, the jury should be free to clarify
any matters of confusion. The rules of evidence ensure that only legally
proper evidence goes to the jury. Other constraints speak only to
counsel's strategy for presentation of evidence. Such consideration
should not supersede a juror's need to know.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol55/iss3/7
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One concession may be made to counsel's strategy concerns. A
judge may ask a juror to delay a particular inquiry until counsel has
had a chance to develop the evidence more fully. This deference is
useful in complex cases where a number of witnesses will testify on an
issue and the juror's question does not concern the specific testimony of
the one witness. This allows counsel the fullest opportunity to inform
the jury in the manner counsel chooses; only when that effort proves
ineffective need jurors ask their questions.

E. Allow Oral Questions
The court should allow jurors to ask their quesitons orally. Written
juror questions allow counsel to object away from the jury and help
withhold inflammatory questions from other jurors. Still, the jury may
be able to discern who objected to what question and jurors may discuss
each other's rejected questions in deliberations. Although the virtue of
a written question procedure is that it controls interrogation, it may
control too much. The cumbersome procedure of writing out all
questions, waiting for court and counsel to edit and choose certain
questions, and then hearing the question asked may prove too much for
some jurors, causing them to withhold some questions. If the court and
jury are miscommunicating, the court's edited questions may not be
what the jury intended to ask. The jury then must re-submit its
questions in another form. If the court fails on the second round the
cycle repeats, consuming a great amount of time to no one's satisfaction.
Oral questions allow direct communication between the juror and
Such direct communication enhances understanding
the witness.
The
procedure is less cumbersome; questions and followthem.
between
ups are easily accommodated. It is also likely that jurors would prefer
asking their own questions themselves. Although jurors may ask
inflammatory questions, such questions likely would have been asked
in deliberations anyway. At least in open court, the judge and counsel
can detect the bias and attempt a remedy. Such statements also are
preserved for appeal. The problem of counsel's need to object is
addressed in large part by the judge's role in the procedure, as discussed
in the next subsection.
F.

The Judge Screens the Questions

For oral questions to work properly, namely, to be fair to the
parties, the judge must be vigilant in rejecting improper questions. The
judge must prohibit sua sponte clearly improper questions. On close
questions, the judge should confer with counsel at the bench. In
considering whether to call up counsel, the judge should defer to
counsel's concerns. Even if the judge believes there is no valid objection,
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1990
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if the judge believes either counsel may want to object, the judge should
call counsel to the bench. For other questions, the judge should be alert
for counsel's objections; if either rise to
object, the judge should
25
immediately call both up for a conference. A
Ultimately, even the best judge will not be able to catch all possibly
improper questions. Thus counsel may be forced to object to certain
questions. The court should require counsel to object. The objection
allows the judge to attempt an immediate remedy. Objection also is
fairer to the parties because it prevents one side from waiting out the
verdict before searching for a basis for appeal. The court can reduce the
prejudicial effects of such objections by requiring counsel only to request
a bench conference to raise its objections.? 6
G. Explain Rejected Questions
When a judge rejects a juror's question, the judge should explain
the rejection to the jury. Such an explanation helps prevent speculation
by the jury, both as to the reasons for the rejection and the forbidden
answer. The explanation also could help clarify for the jury what may
appear labyrinthine and abstruse rules of evidence. Such clarification
could render the trial process generally more understandable.
The explanation should not be a stock response, stating merely that
the question asked is not permitted. The judge should explain to some
extent why a question was rejected, for example, that a defendant has
a constitutional right not to testify or that insurance is not a necessary
factor for the jury's determination of damages.
H. Allow Counsel Re-examination
After the jury's interrogation, counsel should have the opportunity
to re-examine the witness via the usual procedure for direct and cross
examination. Counsel's re-examination should be restricted to the scope
of the subject-matter of the jury's questions. This procedure maintains
fairness to the parties by allowing counsel to address issues raised by
the jury and promotes trial' efficiency by precluding excessive, unrestrained examination and re-examination.
After counsel's re-examination, the jury should have no more
questions. If they do, the court should hear them. The primary concern
is the jury's understanding, which concern is paramount to trial
efficiency. If the jury is confused about a matter or wishes further

245. This is substantially the procedure followed by Judge Wright. See
supranote 229 and accompanying text.
246. Judge Urbom also recommends this method for objection. See Urbom,
supranote 1, at 421.
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information, the jury should be accommodated. But the jury's questions
on re-interrogation should be restricted to the scope of the subject
matter raised in counsels' re-examination. The jury already will have
been given an opportunity to ask any permissible question. They should
not need two such opportunities for the same witness. The jurors
should have no further questions except those raised by counsels' reexamination. If confusion persists in the jurors' minds, then such
confusion is part of the case and the jurors must take it with them into
deliberations.
If the court allows re-interrogation, the court should also allow
counsel the opportunity for another re-examination in the manner
described above. Such subsequent rounds seem very unlikely; the court
will have great discretion in determining when further examination by
counsel and the jury is unnecessary.
1. Appellate Review
Because so much of juror question procedure is controlled by the
trial court, there will be little room for appellate review. An appellate
court generally will be left to find abuse of judicial discretion and
prejudice to appellant to affect a decision. The initial stage of review
must occur at the trial level after the jury has rendered its verdict.
Through the use of a motion for a new trial or judgment n.o.v., counsel
can make their arguments that certain jurors were biased or that the
trial generally was unfair. Based upon his perception of the jurors'
questions and responses to witnesses and counsel, the judge can decide
the prejudice to the appealing party. In making this decision, the judge
should consider the extent of bias or partiality in the jurors' questions
and the degree of antagonism between jurors and counsel or witnesses,
balanced against the weight of the evidence supporting the jury's
7
verdict.2A

On appeal, the appellate court must use the same standard. In
other words, the appellate court really can only review the trial court's
decision for abuse of discretion. It has but a cold transcript to decide
matters that only those present in the court room could fully perceive.
As such, the appellate court cannot determine prejudice or bias as well
as the trial judge who heard the statements.

247. This standard is substantially the same as that stated in People v.
McAlister, 167 Cal. App. 3d 633, 645, 213 Cal. Rptr. 271, 277 (1985), discussed
supranotes 243-44 and accompanying text.
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V. CONCLUSION
The fate of juror questions is as yet untold; judgment shall come
only from time and experience. To date, experience has not shown juror
interrogation to be a perfectly good or perfectly bad procedure. Nor has
any one method of integrating juror questions into traditional trial
procedure proven best. Juror questions work well in some cases and
poorly in others; some techniques are best in some circumstances rather
than others. For now, each judge must choose for himself or herself
whether and how to use juror questions. In Section IV this Comment
presented a model procedure from which a judge may work.
In devising a procedure for implementing juror questions, a judge
should consider the goals sought and the perils to be avoided. At its
best, juror interrogation can enhance the information on which the jury
bases its verdict. By its questions, the jury can seek out important but
neglected information, clarify matters of confusion, and indicate areas
of misunderstanding and miscommunication. To the wary ear, jurors'
questions can reveal underlying bias and improper considerations. But
the jury uncontrolled can become a roving commission led by improper
evidence and inflamed passions to unjust verdicts.
The most essential element in juror interrogation procedure is the
trial judge. Only by the active role of the judge-screening improper
questions, consulting counsel when necessary, and watching for bias and
prejudice-can juror interrogation function properly and fairly. Counsel
cannot be relied on exclusively to govern the procedure because counsel
are in the dilemma of risking juror alienation from frequent objection.
Judicial vigilance is the essential assurance of proper juror interrogation.
How active a role a judge is willing to take will determine the
procedure for juror interrogation. A judge unwilling to monitor a trial
more than the usual amount should not allow juror questions. The
more willing a judge is to participate in trial procedure, the more liberal
the juror interrogation procedure may be. The survey of procedures
presented in Section III provide a wide range from which a judge may
choose. Section IV presents a model procedure for consideration. And
there certainly is room for more judicial innovation.
Whether to implement juror questions is an issue only the trial
judge can decide. The appellate courts cannot decide for the trial courts.
A successful juror interrogation procedure greatly depends on the trial
judge's ability; only by the judge's careful regulation can juror interrogation operate fairly and properly. To force the practice on an unwilling
judge is to invite all the problems of juror questions with little of the
benefits. Experience with juror questions, however, has not shown the
procedure to be so inherently prejudicial as to merit absolute prohibition. To deny a willing judge the opportunity to test juror questions
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denies the courts a possibly beneficial judicial innovation. The ultimate
judgment on juror questions can come only from the trial courts.
MICHAEL A. WoLFF"

* The author acknowledges his grateful appreciation to the
Honorable Scott 0. Wright for his help in the development of this
Comment.
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